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The only way in which international law can command 
respect and obedience among its intended adherents is by 
merging its basic principles with political and social 
reality. Otherwise, it becomes little more than a coll- 
ection of idealistic norms unrelated to the observable 
facts and the operative forces in the relations of states. 
In an attempt to indicate the results of separating law 
from reality, this paper analyzes one principle of inter- 
national law, the doctrine of equality of states. The 
doctrine is traced from its origin in naturalism, to 
eighteenth and nineteenth century voluntaristic positivism 
and, finally, to a non-theoretical application made by 
the new nations of the twentieth century in the United 
Nations system. As an aid by which to examine the rela- 
tion between political reality and the doctrine as applied 
by the naturalists, positivists, and the new nations, 
a theoretical structure designated as a sociological 
perspective of international law is constructed. By 
analyzing each application of the doctrine in light of 
this sociological perspective, this paper attempts to 
indicate the evolution of the doctrine from a state of 
idealism, as represented by the naturalist deduction of 
legal norms from divine revelation, and from a state of
iii
iertness, as represented by the positivist derivation of 
norms from the sovereign will of the state, to a semblance 
of realism, as represented by the new nations and their 
emphasis on deriving pragmatic means to obtainable ends.
This abstract is approved as to form and content.
I recommend its publication.
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INTRODUCTION
For any legal system to have validity, it must 
reflect the political and social realities of a changing 
world; otherwise, the system becomes static, produces 
compliance to its standards by appealing solely to rea­
son and/or morality, and creates schisms between the 
theoretical, structure and the observable facts and the 
operative forces in the relations of states.
Following the First World War, political scientists 
began to take a more active role in the analysis of con­
temporary international affairs."1" Immediately, they 
noted there was little relation between the juristic 
worlds and the conduct of governments. While they did 
not expect exact or invariable conformity to law, they 
began to question the value of law presented simply as a 
collection of norms with little compulsion behind them, 
with little bearing on the decisions of statesmen, and 
with latitude for a wide range of interpretation. What 
was then propounded as law offered no explanation of the 
action of governments and provided no aid to comprehen­
sion nor a measure of expectation by which to guide
2policy. Hence, the study of international law tended
For an excellent discussion on the role of men 
like Leon Duguit and Max Huber in the evolution of inter­
national law during the interwar period, see: Gharles 
De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International 
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 61-67.
^Percy Elwood Corbett, The Study of International
to suffer from lack of realism.
Reacting to this meaningless, laborious perusal 
of international law and believing that legal systems are 
viable in proportion to their relation to power and the 
decision-making process, some political scientists, such 
as Percy E. Corbett, Charles De Visscher, Wolfgang G„ 
Friedmann, Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 
merged their study of law with a sociological analysis
3of world affairs. Law began to be observed, not as a 
static, inflexible rule of conduct which governed all 
men and nations from ideas of abstract right, but as a 
constantly evelving process which grows in relation to 
the evolution of social and political norms. This con­
ception of international law served as a catalyst in the 
reconciliation between legal norms and existing realities 
and provided a rationale for the development of law and 
the adherance to that law by power conscious nations.
By utilizing the basic approach to international
Law (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), 
pp. 1 and 47.
^See Percy E. Corbett, The Study of International 
Law (New York:.- Doubleday and Co'.", Inc., 1955); Charles 
De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International 
Law (Princeton: Princeton 'University Press, 1957); 
Wolfgang G. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of Inter­
national Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); 
Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, The 
Political Foundations of International Lav/ (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961).
law of these publicists, Chapter I constructs a theoretical 
structure, designed as a sociological perspective of 
| international law, that serves as a means by which to 
evaluate the effectiveness of one aspect of international 
law, the doctrine of equality of states.. Like the whole 
of international law, the doctrine of state equality has 
been in a state of flux, evolving from a legal system 
conceived either from a naturalist deduction of partic- 
: ular rules from right reason and divine revelation, the 
j concern of Chapter II, to a positivist derivation of norms 
from the sovereign will of the state, the concern of 
Chapter III. Both levels of doctrinal development, at 
least from a sociological perspective of international 
I law, tended to remain aloof to political and social reality 
i thereby producing a doctrine of state equality consisting 
j solely of formal, static rules. For one thing, both the
i doctrine of natural equality and the doctrine of legal 
equality were products of the p’hil6sophical traditions 
of Western colonial powers with little relevance for the 
dependent peoples.
Thus, the primary objective of Chapter IV is to 
indicate a third level of development for the doctrine, 
produced largely by the heavy influx of new nations dur­
ing the twentieth century. Rather than deriving a new 
theoretical basis for the doctrine, the new nations took 
the general idea of the Western inspired doctrine and 
directly and indirectly invoked it as a rationale
3
4-
for their attempts to gain greater equality with the West. 
These efforts were manifested both in and out of inter­
national organization, although this chapter limits its 
investigation to international organizations, particularly 
the United Nations. By selecting such areas within the 
United Nations system as the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, the Economic and Social Council, the financial 
agencies and by focusing on the new nations1 efforts to 
establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development and a United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, this paper attempts to show the positive 
and negative results of the new nations' demands for 
equality. To analyze the contributions made by the new 
nations to the overall development of the doctrine, their 
efforts in the United Nations are then evaluated in light 
of a sociological perspective in Chapter V.
It should be noted that no attempt is made to just­
ify the theoretical conception underlying this paper as 
the ultimate method by which to judge the validity of the 
doctrine of state equality, or anything. Admittedly, 
this paper's theoretical structure is broad. It simply 
assimilates general trends within recent studies made on 
the theory of law. Regardless of the comprehensity, or 
; lack of it, of conceptual structures, no single approach 
offers theoretical or methodological absolutes. As 
Dag Hammarskjold said:.
5....international constitutional law is still in 
an embryonic stage; we are still in the transition 
between institutional systems of international 
coexistence and constitutional systems of inter­
national cooperation. It is natural that, at such 
a stage of transition, theory is still vague, mixed 
with elements of a political nature and dependent 
on what basically may be considered sociological 
theory.4-
LL Address delivered by Dag Hammarskjold at the 
University of Chicago Law School entitled "The Develop­
ment of a Constitutional Framework of International 
Cooperation," United Nations Review, Vol. 6 (June, I960),
p. 26.
CHAPTER I
THE BASIC TENETS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
OP INTERNATIONAL LAW
This chapter presents the basic tenets of a 
sociological approach to international lav;. First, this 
approach is a reaction to the ineffectiveness of the 
naturalist interpretation of law which conceived law 
as a process of deducing particular rules from "right 
reason" or divine revelation. The naturalists, consisting 
in the Middles Ages of an elite group of theorists repre­
senting the church, the monarchy, and the aristocracy, 
and in the Enlightenment of writers like Samuel Pufendorf, 
placed law on a moral plateau far removed from the real­
ities of the i/orld.. Consequently, law tended to become 
a sterile code of ethics rather than a reflector of 
actualities. 1
Second, a sociological approach is a reaction to 
the inabilities of a positivist interpretation of law to 
grapple with social and political factors in the formula­
tion of law. The positivist approach, while offering
^For an excellent discussion of the naturalist 
interpretation of international law and of additional the­
orists who, like Pufendorf, believed that natural law was 
secular in origin, see: J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 
Sir Humphry Waldock, ed. (6th ed.; Nev; York:. Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1963), pp. 16-25; Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. 
Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961), pp. 52-62; and 
William D.. Coplin, The Functions of International -baw 
(Chicago:. Rand McNally and Co., 1966), pp. 15-16•
7numerous technical theories on the formulation of law, 
tends to become static by its emphasis on the formal pro­
cedures of elaboration, its fixation on the importance 
of state wills, and its stress on only the last phase by 
which norms are formed, the legislative process, as
opposed to the political and social influences which are
2the foundation and ultimate explanation of lav;. While
The Positivist School of law includes several 
strains of thought and while these various strains of 
positivism all share common characteristics, such as the 
emphasis on consent and utility, they do have certain 
differences on which an advocate of a sociological per­
spective of international lav; needs to be aware. William 
D~. Conlin, The Functions of International Law (Chicago: 
Rand McNally and Co., 1966), p. 16. Voluntaristic posi­
tivism, which attained its full rigor and narrowness dur­
ing the nineteenth century "when the movement of national­
ities had multiplied tenfold the power and exclusiveness 
of sovereign states" stresses the science of law at the 
sacrifice of ethical and social bases of international 
law. When speaking of positivism, or particularly legal 
equality as seen in Chapter II, this paper refers primar­
ily to voluntaristic positivism.. The positivism of Leon 
Duguit had its hour of fame after the First World War.
It based the rule of law upon men’s direct perception of 
social necessities and the implementation of this rule by 
the state. While attempting to use realism by the merger 
of fact and norms, he exposed a lack of solidarity inter­
preted in fact by the holders of power. Such theories 
lead to sacrificing human values to the state. For Hans 
Kelsen's pure theory of law, the positivity of norms de­
pends solely on their quality of being logically reducible 
to one fundamental norm (Grundnorm), the ultimate source 
of the legal order.. Such conceptions limit arbitrarily, 
on the pretext of science, the subject matter of law, 
narrowing legal reality. Charles De Visscher, The Theory 
and Reality in Public International Law (Princeton s 
Princeton University Press, 1957), PP- 51-^ 2; ol-o,.
Also, see Kaplan, on. cit., pp. 62-70.
8the naturalist analysis of law relegated law to an 
irrelevant system of ethics, the positivist approach 
analyzed lav/ as an autonomous unit separate and apparent 
from ethics.
Presently, a sociological approach to international 
law offers, at best, a few aids by which to analyze the 
effectiveness of law without attempting to devise new 
theories. According to Morton Kaplan, "We are living 
with a number of makeshift experiments that do not fit 
into the old theory, but neither do they allow us with
5confidence to propose a new theory.This chapter does 
not attempt to construct new theories but only to present 
the following three factors, gleaned from several writers 
in the field of international law, which compose a means 
to evaluate the effectiveness of international law:;
(1) the integration of legal norms with political and 
social realities (2) the conception of law as an evolving 
process rather than a body of formal static rules, and
(3) the reorientation of law into a system of ethics 
through a combination of legal processes and political 
and social realism.
The first premise involved in a sociological approach 
to international lav; is the necessity of integrating legal 
norms with political and social realities. Without
^Kaplan, op. cit,, p. 76.7,
such integration, legal norms are either subject to a 
naturalist appeal to irrelevant maxims derived from man’s 
fluctuating intuition or they are severed from their 
deepest roots for the sole purpose of integrating them in 
a scientific but purely formal system. Charles De
< Visscher noted the traditional estrangement of law ands
i reality when he said:
Entrenched in its formal positions, doctrine long 
evaded direct confrontation of international law with 
politics. At times it simply ignored the political, 
at others it attempted to eliminate it by artificially 
bringing even its most elementary data under legal 
criteria. The defects of such methods become in­
creasingly marked as the profound upheavals in the 
life of the peoples forced the man of law to grasp 
realities more firmly.^
A legal principle becomes effective in proportion 
j to its alliance with reality; otherwise, the principle, 
j and the rules composing it, remain aloof to the practice 
; of centuries.^ Insofar as a rule of international law 
' satisfies the requirement of social conformity, it 
| retains its full force in application. The importance 
! of this criterion is well illustrated in treaty regulation. 
A normative or law-making treaty with a content too far 
in advance of development in international relations is
^De Visscher, ojo. cit., p. 70.
^Georg Schwarzenberger, The Inductive Approach to 
International" Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1965), p. 78.
10
stillborn while a treaty which ceases to be exactly
■
observed in the practice of governments no longer remains 
valid. 0
"A realistic study of lav/ must, " according to 
Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "see law 
in relation to its institutional support, examining the 
larger process though which rules are created, applied 
and administered. " ”'7 Since there is a difference between 
the institutions which accomplish this within a domestic 
system and within the international community, it becomes 
I necessary to analyze law within the framework of its 
particular political context.
As participants in the political processes of 
government, we all seek to influence official action 
so that it accords as nearly as possible with our 
preferences with the kind of society (local, national 
global) that we want, and that supports a distribu­
tion of values of which we approve. We seek at every 
level to persuade, cajole, and coerce the officials 
who set policy, to make them enact rules that will 
distribute rewards and penalties in accordance with 
our desires... Order itself may be high on the 
scale of values - today violence in the international 
community may mean annihilation - history indicates 
that other values may be more important to various 
participants... We are concerned with understanding 
the norms that are enforced as law within society. 
Whether these norms accord with a higher or eternal 
"law" is a different question.&
^De Visscher, op,. cit., p. 153*
^Kaplan and Katzenbach, on. cit., p. 6.
QKaplan.and Katzenbach, on. cit. , pp. 18-19.
11
For H.„ B.. Jacobin!, all law must be viewed as a
s ' '
political phenomenon and international law, specifically, 
j has an even more obvious political orientation than other 
fields of law. Often it is noted that the sources of 
international law are custom, principles, treaties, 
writings, and court decisions, but these sources do not 
explain why they have power or reality. Regardless of 
i whether valid metaphysical principles underlie a 
| particular rule or whether it emerges from the dictate
< of a sovereign in the Austinian sense, the crux of the 
j matter is whether there is proper support to sustain the
9j maxim, and if so, how this support is evidenced.
| Alejandro Alvarez, referring to the impact of political 
and social influences on law, said:;
National law, especially social legislation, is 
inspired by or takes into account these factors,_ 
but"they do not by themselves form this legislation. 
In international law the said elements incorporate 
themselves into it, they are what constitutes it; 
one does not treat then of a legislator who takes 
them into accounts The best proof of my affirmation 
is that, if these factors are modified, by that^  
circumstance alone the law appears antiquated in
J^o'hn Austin, an English jurist, believed that all 
law originates with a sovereign will and that because 
international law concerned several sovereignties, it 
deviated from the pattern and was, therefore, a useful 
sort of "positive morality," not true law. For additional
S information on juristic schools and the relation of law 
i to political phenomenon, see: H. B. Jacobini, international 
I Law: A Text (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc.,
1 1962), pp. “24-28.
12
the connection or in the matter expressly affected 
by the change and it is not respected. 10
Once it is recognized that to be effective law 
cannot transcend its political base, then any reformation 
of law begins in the realm of politics. Hence, the role 
j of law becomes, according to J. L. Brierly, not a creator 
; of order, but an instrument "to underpin the fabric of■
! order once this has been established.'
The second premise involved in a sociological 
approach to international lav; is the necessity of con-
• ceiving law as an evolving process rather than a body of
■
! formal static rules. If the effectiveness of law rests
j on its- integration with reality, then any change occurring
1within the political and social milieu will naturally 
j bring corresponding changes in the legal processes. It 
was the failure of the naturalistic and positivistic 
approaches to law to adjust to a world in flux that 
caused legal theoreticians such as Charles De Visscher, 
Percy E. Corbett, and Wolfgang Gaston Friedmann to
10Alexandro Alvarez, Despues de la querra (Buenos 
i Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 19^ -3), p.. 286 a® quoted in Ibid.., p. 29.
^Additional emphasis on the necessity of integra­
ting legal norms with political and social realities, is 
given by: Percy E. Corbett, The Study of International Law 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961); and 'Quincy 
Wright, Contemporary International Law (New York: Random 
House, 136177 '■
15
; champion new approaches which would reflect political
T Ofluidity. De Vis softer believed that only through a 
realistic appraisal of power and its utilization in the 
creation of legal norms could law evolve into an effect-I
| ive pattern of behavior. It was the conception of law
~
as an autonomous structure, unrelated to reality by the 
positivistic approach to international lav/, that 
| motivated DeVisscher to say:
The fundamental position of positivism, excluding 
as it did from international law everything that could 
not be traced to agreements of State wills, impressed 
a markedly static character upon this lav/.. By re­
ducing the formative factors of the law to such 
agreements, which would logically have to be removed 
for every amendment of the law in force, voluntaristic 
positivism singularly accentuated^ t'he propensity of 
international law to immobility.13
According to Corbett, legal institutions serve as
.
indicators of the development of international law. He
I
notes, however, that even a study of legal institutions 
proves little if it does not glean from the study of man 
and society the idea "that legal institutions only evolve 
with a consensus on ends and means that is deeply rooted
1 PCorbett suggests that natural law, rather than 
remaining static, consisted of a collection of notions 
which varied from time to time and from one society to 
another; however, this variance of natural law concerned 
its application as a means of justification rather than 
as a reflector of changing political and social environ­
ment. (Corbett, o£. cit., p. 4.)
■^De Vissc'her, 0£. cit., p.. 52.
14
in the slow and often unconscious processes of legal 
14integration."
One of the most recent advocates of a cause and
effect relationship in international law is Wolfgang
Friedmann.. For him, "the changing structure and scope
of international relations demands a corresponding
adjustment in the structure and scope of international 
15law." y He notes that the structure of interstate 
relations has changed during the past fifty years in 
five central respects and that law, in order to be more 
effective, must reflect these changes.:
(1 ) The small, elite club of Western nations during 
the last century has expanded during the present 
century to nations representing different 
civilizations. (Horizontal changes)
(2) International relations has shown a greater 
sensitivity for social and economic matters 
"to the extent that the matters requiring 
international regulations are sensitive to 
differences in political, economic and social 
philosophy." (Vertical changes)
^Corbett, ojd. cit... p. 49.
■^Wolfgang Gaston Friedmann, T'he Changing 
Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964), p.. 365.
15
(3) Since World War II, there has been a greater 
concern with international economic development.
(4) The advent of thermonuclear weapons has caused 
changes in the minimum conditions of national 
survival and has made "coexistence between the 
rival- political blocs roughly balanced in 
destructive power."
(5) The population explosion and the depletion of 
the earth's natural resources are a less 
dramatic, but a more destructive threat to 
mankind. ^
According to Friedmann, the theory advanced by some
writers, notably Hans J. Morgenthou, that "law in general,
and especially international law, is primarily a static
social force" and "indicates the ideological disguise of
a policy of the status quo" may have been an accurate
interpretation of the traditional international law of
coexistence, but it fails to characterize the developing
"co-operative" law of international organization as
either an implementation or a spur, in some cases, to
the forces and interests in mankind striving toward the
17application of common objectives.
16Ibid.
17'Ibid., p. 58. Hans J. Morgenthou represents an 
approach in international relations usually termed "realism" 
although such realism unduly condemns international law to 
a position of immobility. See Hans J. Morgentou, Politics 
Among Nations (3rd ed. rev., New York: Alfred A.
16
International law, and especially the law of 
international organization, while inevitably con­
solidating and thereby, for a time stabilizing, 
certain dynamic political and social forces, is to- ^ 
day overwhelmingly an agent of progress and evolution. “
The third premise involved in a sociological approach 
to international law is the necessity to reorient law 
into a system of ethics, through a combination of legal 
: processes and political and social realism. This third 
tenet attempts to reconcile the extremes displayed by 
the naturalists and positivists, while the naturalists 
conceived law as a pattern of behavior derived from a 
source which had little relation to reality, the positiv- 
j ists either isolated themselves from legal ethics by 
concentrating on the formal procedures of deriving law, 
such as agreements of state wills, or they attempted to 
revive ethical considerations by placing them "...in the 
form of captious arguments that seek to legitimize the 
accomplished fact..."1  ^ Traditional international ethics 
was either a system of unobtainable objectives which 
espoused a doctrine of absolute right or absolute wrong, 
or it was an inherent part of a national foreign policy 
, which identified a nation's actions with a Divine Will.
Neither approach attempted to use realism in the 
j formulation of an ethic which, contrary to a means of
Knopf, 1965), p. 91. See also P.H.„ Kooijmans, The 
Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States (Leyden, Nether- 
lands, A.W. Sythoff, 1964), pp. 107-116.
^Friedmann, ojd. cit., p. 58.
■^De Visscher, 0£. cit., p. 52.
justification, sought to obtain achievable ends for the 
development of international cooperation rather than a prim­
itive society consisting of factions fighting among 
themselves.
Coupling the conception of international law as
an agent of progress with the merger of political realism
and ethics, Friedmann suggests that the abolition of
national-interest in international relations is not the
answer to the challenge posed by the changes in the
structure of international society; the challenge does,
however, radically affect the dimensions and objectives
20of national-interest.
Because the content of 'national interest’ is 
changing according to the circumstances of time and 
space, it is as consistent at one time with the 
pursuit of absolute national sovereignty as it is 
at another time with the organization of a regional 
union, and effective international order force, or 
even a world federation. It is, of course, possible 
to pursue values and ideals of international order, 
not from the standpoint of national interest but 
as ethical or political goals antithetic to the 
interests of a nation, which a particular statesman... 
may regard as outdated... But it is equally possible 
to work for the strengthening of international law 
and authority from the standpoint of 'enlightened 
national interest' as being the best or^even the 
only way of ensuring national survival. 21
Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian who bases his 
purview of political life on the egoism of men, also
*
has been most vocal on the subject of ethics and realism.
17
?0Friedmann, ojd. cit., p. 57.
PIFriedmann, ojd. cit., p. 48.
18
He fears a secular humanism which emphasizes the 
; progression of mankind through social engineering because 
it either lives on illusions of human goodness or it,
] because of the lack of man's response to strict behavior­
istic theories, falls into despair. Not wanting to 
offer absolurist positions on the behavior of man, he 
has developed a "flexible, contextual ethic," which allows 
him more room for political maneuvering than does the
22absolute moralism of many "Christian political theorists."
An approach needed by all nations and expressed to
- a great extent by the new nations is one which insists
1I that processes of lav/ - government cannot accurately
i be described or analyzed except in their appropriate 
contextual framework. This approach, termed realism 
by Morton Kaplan, has the effect of "...broadening 
the focus of scholarly attention by seeking to clarify
Janet Elaine Wolfe, "The Doctrine of Man and 
Politics in the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr," (unpublished 
Master's thesis, Department of Political Science, Univer­
sity of Colorado, 1965), pp. 145-144. For a good example 
of Niebuhr's contextual ethics, see: Reinhold Niebuhr,
Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1932). Additional information on the relationship 
between realism and ethics can be found in the following: 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons_, 1940); Ernest V/. 
LePever, Ethics and United States Foreign Policy (New York: 
Meridian Books, Inc., 1957).
19
the goals sought, the methods whereby they can be 
achieved and assumptions about human and institutional 
behavior." As a result, he continues, by taking a 
broader view of the legal process, one notices "the legal
process has moved much closer to policy, and thus to
23politics, ethics, morals, and justice."
Speaking pointedly to the new need for newer 
insights of the relation between realism and ethics, De 
Visscher said:.
The hour is not one for doctrinal generalizations 
moving in the rhythm of a transcendental logic, or 
for brilliant systematizations in which intellectual 
ingenuity often counts for more than respect for the 
facts. It is rather one that challenges us to 
recognize the limits which in our day the dependence 
of international lav; on the historical forms of power 
distribution sets to its effectiveness, and to seek 
in the human ends of power the moderating principle 
that may develop aspirations to international 
collaboration. Every renewed recognition of the 
foundations of power stimulates a renewal of values, 
every return to the realities holds, promises of 
effectiveness.24
T'hese three factors of a sociological approach 
to international law are guages by which this paper will 
evaluate the effectiveness and reality of the doctrine of
• equality of states as a representative element in the
■ whole of international lav/.
2^Kaplan, ojd. cit., p. 75*
“^ De Visscher, 0£. cit., p. 365.
CHAPTER II
THE DOCTRINE OP NATURAL EQUALITY OP STATES
The first attempt to provide a theoretical 
foundation to international relations was made by an 
appeal to natural law. Because of the lack of 
theoretical precedent from which to construct a more 
systematic and specific analysis of international 
relations, the naturalist interpretation of the re-A.
lations between states was composed, basically, of 
broad generalities. Nevertheless, these theoretical 
generalities served as a source through which specific 
principles, such as the doctrine of state equality, 
were later deduced by the publicists of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.
The principle of the natural eauality of states 
implied, according to Edwin Dickinson, an equality of
]_capacity of rights. This principle was grounded in
|
* the following four sources: (l) the law of nature,
The equality of capacity of rights is commonly 
described as simply an equality of rights. This conception 
does not mean that all states have the same rights, but 
that all are equally capable of acquiring rights, enter­
ing into transactions, and performing acts. Edwin D. 
Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press', 1920), p. 4. See 
J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
(ed.) (6t'h ed. ; New York: Oxford University Press, 196$),
! p. 132.
21
(2) the conception of natural equality, (3) the idea of
the state of nature, and (4-) the analogy between natural
2persons and separate states.
The birth of the idea of natural law can be traced 
to early Greek philosophy, particularly to the Platonic 
and Aristotelian schools. Aristotle's conception 
of lav; was dualistic in that law was either common, con­
forming to nature and admitted among civilized men, or it 
was particular, established by each community for itself.
Lav;, now, I understand to be either peculiar or 
universal; peculiar to be that which has marked out 
by each people in reference to itself, and that this 
partly unwritten, partly written I call that law 
universal, which is conformable merely to dictates 
of nature; for there does exist naturally an 
universal sense of right and wrong, which in a 
certain degree, all intuitively divine, even should 
no intercourse with each other, nor any compact 
have existed...^-
The law of nature was merged with ethics by Stoics, 
a school of philosophers that believed natural law embod­
ied the sum of those principles which are based in human 
nature, and which determine the conduct befitting man as 
a rational and social being. Stoicism asserted that the 
perfect life was one that conformed to these principles 
by the use of human reason, although they recognized the
2Ibid.
5Ibid.
^Aristotle Rhetoric i. 13, 2, as quoted in Ibid.,
p. 7.
difference between the ideal character of society and its 
actually existing institutions. Toward the dawn of the 
Roman Republic, this belief of natural right founded upon 
reason found its way to Rome where Cicero made it the 
source and foundation of the highest law, the ,jus naturale, 
While Greek philosophy had emphasized the metaphysical 
and moral aspects of natural law, Roman thought, under 
the influence of Cicero, brought natural lav; into more 
intimate relationship with actual rules of human conduct 
and, thus, the .jus gentium, a law which represented the 
real or what was universally established, and the ,jus 
naturale came to be regarded as generally synonymous.
22
In effect, the two aspects of law were the same, although 
perceived from different points of view, because rules 
which were everywhere observed, the ,jus gentium, should 
surely be rules which the rational nature of man prescribes
5to him, the ,jus naturale.
The theories of Cicero, with only slight divergen­
cies, i;ere transmitted to the Middle Ages by the Church 
Fathers. Nature v/as identified with God and the law of 
nature was equated with the unwritten law of God. This 
idea was stated most succinctly in Gratian's Decretum:
L. Brierly, The Lav; of Rations, Sir Humphrey 
Waldock,(ed.) (6th ed.; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1963), p.-. 18.
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All laws are either divine or human. Divine laws 
are in accord with nature, human laws with custom; 
and therefore the latter vary, since some are suited 
to one nation, some to another... Natural law is 
common to all nations in that it is adhered to 
everywhere by the instinct of nature'without legislation. 5
In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Acquinas taught 
that the law of nature, one of four types, of law which 
; also included eternal, human, and divine lav/, was that 
| part of the law of God which is ascertained by human 
;reason, in contrast with the part which is directly re­
vealed. The equation of natural lav/ with the lav/s of 
God gave the former a position of superiority to the 
positive laws of human ordinance.^
Due to the tendency throughout the thirteenth, 
■fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries to revert to the 
j ancient philosophers and to such ecclesiastical author- 
! ities as Gratian and Acquinas, the law of nature became 
cast in ethical or theological overtones. During the 
course of the Reformation, however, Protestant v/riters 
like John Calvin who did not acknowledge the authority
of the Catholic Church or the Canon Law recurred to
8Roman texts. Since the Catholic disputants desired
6Gratian Decretum Distincto priraa 1,6, 7, as quoted 
in Dickinson, op. cit., p. 20.
7'Brierly, ojd. cit., p. 18.
OFor a good discussion on the early Protestant 
reformers, see: George H. Sabine, A History of Political 
Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961;, 
pp. 354-370.
1 to meet their Protestant antagonists on even ground, the 
;result was the bringing of classical Homan law into greater 
jprominance, and thereby, preparing the way for the 
:writers of the modern law of nations by placing the
9jiiscussion of natural law in secular and legal molds.'
This secularization of the law of nature became 
even more evident during the seventeenth and eighteenth
'centuries. Natural law retained its set of general prin-
.
|ciples which were to direct the actions of man and the 
I writing of law, but these principles were merged with the 
)idea that they were to be derived from man's observations
■
of reality and his ability to see the operations of the 
natural laws themselves in the universe. During the 
Enlightenment and its emphasis on universal principles, 
writers like Samuel Pufendorf sought to justify obed­
ience to international law with the rationale that it 
was required by natural laws prescribing human beiiavior, 
including relations among states. 10
The origin of the idea of natural equality is 
vague, although according to Dickinson, it began some­
where in that obscure period between Aristotle's teach­
ing of the natural inequality of human nature and 
Cicero's idea of the natural equality of mankind. Cicero 
..... ---n..-.....
^Dickinson, on., cit., p. 21.
10William D„ Coplin, The Functions of International 
j Law (Chicago:- Rand McNally, 1966), p. 15•
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in contrast to Aristotle's belief that "some men are by 
nature free, and others slaves..,.," asserted that:
...there is no one thing so like or so equal to 
another, as in every instance man is to man... And 
if corruption of customs, and the variation of 
opinions*, did not induce an imbecility of minds, 
and turn them aside from the course of nature, no 
one would more nearly resemble himself than all men 
would resemble all men.l-
Natural equality, like natural law, was later in­
corporated into the Homan ,jus naturale, although Homan 
lawyers such as Ulpian, Florentinus, and Tryphoninus 
recognized the universality of slavery and, therefore, 
tied the institution of slavery with the .jus gentium in 
order to avoid destroying the idealism of the ,jus 
naturale. When Ulpian declared that all men are equal 
!(omnes homines aequales sunt), he intended to affirm 
that under the ideal .jus naturale and insofar as positive 
law approximated it. By the time of Justinian, however, 
the idea of equality in the Roman legal system acquired 
the significance which it was to retain during the Middle 
Ages. 12
The concept of natural equality also was influenced 
by Christian theology. Faith in Jesus Christ destroyed 
all racial and social barriers to the point that Paul 
I proclaimed, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is
^Cicero Dele,gibus i.10, as quoted in Dickinson, 
j on. cit., p. 1 3.
12 r-Dickinson, on. cit., p. 16.
neither bond or free, there is neither male or female:
l7'for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." " Slavery,common 
during the early Church, was regarded as belonging to 
the outer man since all men, whether slave or free, were 
; considered equal in capacity for the moral and spiritual 
life. This idea was expanded by the Church Fathers who 
| believed that men as created by God were xree and equal.
This conception of equality, much like the one inherent 
in the Roman .jus naturale, recognized the difference 
between Divine Will of equality for mankind and 
actual .inequality through slavery. The distinction 
| between ideal equality and actual inequality was attrib­
uted by St. Augustine to the presence of sin which 
required coercion to make men observe the principles 
of justice and right. Coercion was unnecessary in the
original state of nature, however, because of the rule
14of perfect equality.
The opinions of the Roman jurists on equality 
I and slavery were conveyed to the Middle Ages by the 
!reassertion of the civilian jurists that equality by 
j the jus naturale was an ideal norm rather than a prac- 
tical rule. Similarly, the opinions of the Church 
Fathers on natural equality and of slavery as a coercive 
measure to insure justice among sinful men were transmitted 
_____________ ’
15Gal. 3:28.
■^ Dickinson, 0£. cit., pp. 17-19.
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to the theologians of the Middle Ages. Rufinus, a twefth
century commentator on Gratian, reconciled the conflict
between the ,jus naturale and the nus gentium in regard
to equality by i;including within the former a trichotomy
composed of commands, prohibitions, and demonstrations.
The commands and prohibitions were unchangeable; whereas,
the demonstrations, which included natural liberty,
could be changed on occasion so that the true end of
15j natural law might be realized.
The foundation of Medieval scholarship on which 
the writer of the modern law of nations based the mat­
erials for their treatises contained few conceptions
of greater importance than that of the equality of men
10*by the natural law.
The third source used by the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century publicists who propounded the 
doctrine of natural equality of states was the idea 
of a state of nature. While this concept held no great 
interest for philosophers such as Aristotle and Cicero, 
it did occupy an important position in the political 
theories of Seneca during the early Christian era. Sen­
eca believed that a golden age, or primitive state of 
innocence, preceeded the age of conventional institutions
^Dickinson, 00. cit., pp. 23-24.
^Dickinson, 0£. cit., p. 25.
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But the first men and their immediate descendents 
followed Nature; pure and uncorrupt, and held the same 
both for their leader and the law; by an orderly sub­
mission of the worse to the better: for this was 
ever the rule of simple Nature... '//hat could be hap­
pier than the race of man? They enjoyed all Nature 
in common, she as a kind parent was the protectress 
of all men; and gave them secure possession of the 
public wealth.*-'■
Dickinson noted that the Roman jus naturale had
no connection with the primitive state of nature,
; although the Fathers, on the other hand, were heavily
| influenced by the idea. They equated Seneca's belief
in the Golden Age with the state of man before the Great
Fall when he was in perfect communion with God and one-
ness with his brother through the common possession of
materials and, thereby, negating any need for government.
| Because of sin, however, man fell from this era of
harmony and governemnt was instituted in order to provide
18a semblance of order.
The writers of the Middle Ages reproduced the 
theory of the state of nature in a variety of forms.
The civilian jurists frequently justified the presence 
of institutions which were at variance with natural law 
by assuming that natural law was much like a primitive 
condition of man while the actual scoial and political 
institutions reflected less primitive but less perfect
-^Seneca Ad Lucilium enistularum moralim 90, as 
quoted in Dickinson, oj>. cit., p. 26.
iqconditions. In the scholastic literature of the later 
Middle Ages, there is also evidence of the theory. Marsilus 
of Padua began his account of the origin of civil commun­
ities with the state of nature. During the fifteenth 
century, Aeneas Sylvius presented the concept with great 
literary grace by merging the Biblical version of para­
dise with the ornateness of pagan philosophy. The theory 
was inherent in such anti-monarchist treatises as the 
Vindicias contra t.yrannos and George Buchanan' s De jure 
regni apud Scotus during the sixteenth century to buttress 
their attack on royal absolutism. They asserted that the 
king's power is delegated by the people when they "renounced
as it were the privilege of nature" and created govern-
POmental institutions. The concept of the state of nature 
was indeed, "pregnant with possibilities for the seven­
teenth century jurist, seeking an explanation for the new 
international society which was gradually taking shape
IQyFor an example of the influence of such thinking 
on medieval treatises, see Dickinson, oj>. cit., p. 28.
poDickinson, on. cit., p. 28. Although the Vindiciae 
contra t.yrannos was published under the pseudonym Stephen 
Junis Brutus, the real author is unknown. For additional 
information on the treatise? in particular, and a good 
purview of anti-royalist theories, see Sabine, ojd. cit., 
pp. 372-391.
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in the policy of Europe."^ 1
The analogy between natural persons and separate 
states made its appearance only with the rise of the 
modern law of nations, although it had roots in certain 
areas of thought which were characteristic of the Middle 
Ages. John of Salisbury made one of the first attempts to 
equate parts of the natural body with parts of the state. 
The spiritual leadership represented the soul of the 
state, the prince as the head, the judges and officers 
as the eyes, ears, and tongue, the senate as the heart, 
the executive a s the unarmed and the army as the armed 
hand, the treasury as the belly and intestines, and the 
land folk as the feet. The state was the "individual 
writ large" to the extent that the protection of the 
people was equated with shoeing and their distress with 
gout.. Ptolomaus of Lucca believed that as harmony of 
organic forces exists within the natural body, there 
is a harmony within the state which, through reason, 
brings the various forces into correlation and perfects 
their unity. Engelbert of Wolkersdorf, Marsilus of 
Padua, and Nicholas of Cues also likened the state to 
the individual. The analogy of the individual with 
the organic functions of the state did not develop into 
the idea of state personality during the Middle Ages, 
although the medieval publicists had laid the foundation
30
PIDickinson, op. cit., p. 29.
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for such development. The medieval belief in the 
organic concept of the state was not much different 
from the principles later proclaimed by Hobbes and 
Pufendorf that civilian institutions are much like human 
personalities and are, therefore, the subjects of that 
identical lav/ of nature, which controls natural individuals
Following the Reformation and during the decay 
of the religiously oriented political system, a new use 
was found for the four conceptions. Because of the in­
capacity of either the Emperor or the Pope to command 
universal obedience, the old theory of a common superior 
died and the notion of a society of states replaced the 
idea of a universal empire. Thus, the publicists were 
faced with the task of finding an explanation for the 
new society and of shaping the law to meet the new con­
ditions. Generally, the neitf law was derived from two 
sources. First, there was a reference to established 
customs, usages, and understandings. Second, there was 
an appeal to the law of nature, a law grounded on reason, 
applicable to the relations between states, aid adaptable 
to that large part of international relations not cov­
ered by established custom. There was a tendency to 
reason that since a common superior no longer controlled
OpDickinson, 0£. cit., p. 31; also see: Edwin D. 
Dickinson, "The Analogy Between Natural Persons and Inter­
national Persons in the Lav/ of Nations," Yale Law Review 
xxvi (April, 1917), p- 364.
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the relations of separate states, the separate states 
were in a state of nature with respect to each other, 
similar to the state of nature which existed for pre­
political man, and were, therefore, controlled by 
natural law.. Through deductive analysis, it was easy to 
conclude from these premises that the principle of 
natural equality applied to separate states in the 
international society.2^
It is too tempting to credit Hugo Grotius as the
first proponent of the natural equality of states since
he wrote the first treatise setting forth a general
system of law to govern the relations of States during
the first half of the seventeenth century when natural
law was used extensively as a rationale behind inter-
24national relations. Nevertheless, Grotius, while 
asserting the principle of the natural equality of man, 
never applied the principle to states except in certain 
particular instances such as his argument for freedom 
of the seas and his belief that contracts between 
sovereigns were controlled by the law of nature.^
23^Dickinson, oj>. cit.-, pp. 32-33; also see: Kaplan, 
op. cit., pp. 52-62.
24Corbett, 0£. cit., p. 12; also see: Grotius 
De riure belli ac pacis.
25•^ Grotius' aguments for freedom of the seas are 
in Mare liberum. His comments on contracts between 
sovereigns are in De ,jure belli ac pacis, ii, 2, 5. 
Dickinson noted that Grotius made several implications 
concerning equal protection of the laws, a meaning
Grotius did not advance the idea that national 
institutions had been created because of man's abandon­
ment of the state of nature, while nations remained in 
the natural condition as far as international relations 
are concerned. He also made no attempt to use the anal­
ogy between natural persons and the state as a means of 
explaining the nature of international relations or of 
translating the concept of equality into the society 
of states.
Perhaps the greatest influence on the development 
of the theory of the natural equality of states was 
Thomas Hobbes. By using the whole medieval belief in 
natural law, the state of nature, natural equality, and 
the analogy between natural persons and the state, Hobbes 
prepared the way for men to translate the four concepts 
into the law of nations by replacing the word "men" for 
the word "states" and thus, to form a series of postulates 
strikingly similar to those which dominated thought on 
international relations for the next two centuries. He 
stated that once states are created, they acquire the 
nature of men and that the relations between states are 
in a natural condition analogous to that prevailing among
somewhat different than the one implied in natural 
equality, and equality of capacity for rights. (Dickinson, ot>. cit., p. 35.)
2oDickinson, o£. cit., pp. 48-50.
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men in the state of nature. Hence, it follows that 
the same law:
...which speaking of the duty of single men we 
call natural, being applied to whole cities and 
nations, is called the right of nations. And the 
same elements of natural law and right, which have 
hitherto been spoken of, being transferred to whole 
cities and nations, may be taken for the elements 
of the laws and rights of nations. 28
Samuel Pufendorf is accredited as the theorists 
who first utilized the thinking of his predecessors and 
directly applied the four concepts to international 
relations. The basis of his thought rested on the con­
cept of the state of nature. He believed that the natural 
state of man contained natural laws of human conduct which, 
although imposing certain obligations on man, were, 
nevertheless, imperfect. According to Pufendorf, the 
only means by which the imperfection of the natural laws 
could be translated into a perfect law was through the 
creation of an organized authoritative community, the 
state. Using the analogy between natural persons and 
states, Pufendorf arrived at the conclusion that nations 
live in a state of nature which, like the state of nature 
for individuals, contains rules based on natural lav;.
The difference between the two states of nature, however, 
was that while an individual could abandon the natural 
state for reasons of legal security, nations could not
^Dickinson, on. cit., pp. 69-74.
2®Thomas Hobbes Dominion xiv, 4, as quoted in 
Dickinson, o£. cit., p. 75*
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abandon the natural state. Yet, the natural state of 
nations contains fewer legal imperfections since, because 
of the lack of a higher authority to which nations other­
wise would be subjected, it contains a state's greatest 
assets, ultimate liberty and equality with other nations. 
"It is this formalistic, mathematical notion of equality, 
based upon individualism," says P. H., Kooijmans, "that 
is for the first time presented by Pufendorf as a legal
p Qconception..."
The clearest, most concise explanation of the 
naturalist position of the doctrine of state equality 
came from Emeric de Vattel during the mid-eighteenth 
century.
Since men are by nature equal, and their individual 
rights and obligations the same a s coming equally 
from nature, Nations, which are composed of men and 
may be regarded as so many free persons living to­
gether in a state of nature, a re"by nature equal and 
hold from nature the same obligations and the same 
rights. Strength or weakness, in this case, count 
for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; 
a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than 
the most powerful Kingdom. Prom this equality it 
necessarily follows that what is lawful~or unlawful 
for one Nation is euually lawful or unlawful for every other Nation.30
Prom the later half of the 1700's to the present, 
it is difficult to indicate the utilization of all four
35
29'Kooijmans, 0£. cit., pp. 76-79.
30Emeric de Vattel Droit des sens, para. 18 and 19, 
as quoted in P.- H_. Kooijmans, The Doctrine~ of the Legal 
Equality of States (Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Syt'hoff, 1964), p. 84.
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concepts in the presentation of the principle of the 
natural equality of states, although there are evidences 
of publicists using only one of the concepts.. Dickinson 
noted that such nineteenth century writers as Robert 
Phillimore and Hannis Taylor regarded equality as a 
natural right or as a principle which is based upon 
natural right. Henry Wheaton repeated the idea that 
the society of states was only a state of nature. Paul 
Pradier-Podere, Robert Piedelievre, and the early twenti­
eth century publicist Prantz Despagnet explained and just­
ified the equality of states by applying the analogy be­
tween natural persons and states as international
31persons.
Presently, according to P. H. Kooijmans, the idea 
of absolute, inalienable rights, including the right of 
state equality, preceding the legal community (This 
notion is very similar to the theory of the state of 
nature) is seldom championed. Alfred Verdross, however, 
does retain the belief that fundamental rights are rights 
to which the states are directly entitled on the ground 
of their international legal personality. Verdross' 
concept of fundamental rights for states parallels the 
idea of fundamental rights for individuals. When speaking 
of natural equality, Josef Priedrick Felder appeals
 ^For a good documentation with quotes from 
primary sources on each of the publicists, see Dickinson, 
op. cit., pp. 110-115.
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to natural laws discovered through human reason. He 
believes that the criterion needed for determining how 
the principle of state equality is applicable to existing 
inequalities and to historical development is justice, 
a value which is immanently present in all things.
Wilfred Schaumann presents a twofold application of the 
principle of state equality, one that he terms "e^alitar1 
which is principally formal, and the second that he terms 
"wertend" which is, on the strength of the particular 
valuation on which it is founded, principally material. 
Both are dependent upon whether in a given case equality 
or inequality should be given precedence. Schaumann noted 
that the egalitarian or formal solution will lose its 
character or equality if the actual inequalities require 
a differentiation of rights and obligations. Thus, for 
equality to- be more than purely formal, it must be based 
on justice and justice, in turn, must be based on con­
science, the human sense of right. The proof for such 
justice is not logically deduced, but it depends upon 
belief in the existence of a certain order of values that 
God gave man. This is a modern appeal to natural law. 
Schaumann's thought also proceeds from the smallest unit, 
the human individual, to the greatest, the international 
community; hence, the substance of the doctrine of state 
equality is contained in the doctrine of human equality. 
Consequently, this assertion becomes nothing more than 
a modern appeal to the historical analogy between natural
persons and states as international persons."'
At a time when the borderline between peace and 
warms as thin as between reprisals and piracy, the 
naturalists' interpretation of international law, in 
general, and the doctrine of state equality, in particular, 
was an attempt to analyze and systematize the legal raw 
material existing in international relations. While the 
naturalists deduced their systems of the law of nations 
from no one source, their application of quotations from 
the Bible, Church Fathers, classical writers, mythology, 
history, the state practice to interstate activity 
served the purpose of devising a national system. What
might be considered irrelevant to one section of public
33opinion was considered binding authority to another.''"'
Nevertheless, the vagueness of principles such as 
state equality which the naturalists deduced from their 
premises was predestined to lead to the principles' 
mythicizing. The derivation of doctrine from natural­
istic methods opened the way for anyone to prove whatever 
he wanted to prove, and, as Schwarzenberger states, 
"...chancelleries were not slow in using for their own
^Kooijmans, op. cit., pp. 215-217; 230-234. For 
a good discussion of the influence of natural law on mod­
ern thinking in international law, see: Joseph L. Kunz, 
"Natural Law Thinking in the Eodern Science of International 
Law," American Journal of International Lav; 55 (1963), pp. 
951-958; Coplin, -op. cit., p. 15; Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 7 
79; Kaplan, op. cit., p. 61; and Marek St. Korowicz, intro­
duction to International Law (The Hague: Martinus Ni.i'hoff,
1 9 5 9 P. "5.
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-^Schwarzenberger, o£. cit., p. 11.
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: purposes such pliable doctrines." Consequently, it was 
' not long before international law was reduced to an 
ideology of raison d'etat and the scientific value of 
the deductive method, if not the law of nations itself, 
was jeopardized.^ A good example of the cheapening 
of natural law principles and the fickleness with which 
: they were used is the distinction which was often drawn 
; between immutable first principles and the mutable 
! secondary rules. This dichotomy was stated clearly by 
! St. Thomas Acauinas:
A change in the natural law may be understood in 
two ways. ~One way is the way of addition; and in 
that way there is nothing to hinder the natural law 
being changed... Another conceivable way...is the 
way of subtraction, that something should cease to 
be of the natural law that was of it before. Under­
standing change in this sense, the natural lav; is 
absolutely immutable in its first principles: but 
as to secondary precepts, which are certain detailed 
conclusions related to the first principles, the 
natural law is not so changed as that its dictate 
is not right in most cases steadily to abide by...^
• There was no single criterion which determined what was
an immutable first principle and what was a mutable
; secondary principle. The determining factor was
inevitably a person's subjective reasoning..
Hence, the suspicion which slowly encircled the
naturalistic interpretation of international law spurred
an increasing number of attempts to probe more deeply
: into the deductive reasoning of legal naturalism. Soon,
 ^Sc'hwarzenberger, op. cit., p. 12.
55st. Thomas Acquinas Summa theologica ii, 90 as 
; quoted in Dickinson, op. cit., p. 22.
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it was detected that naturalist law-finding was actually 
law making in disguise. Naturalists never realized 
j that by itself, natural law was too abstract to provide 
a sufficient support for any legal system. They agreed 
on the importance of natural law, but they never agreed
■ on the essential character of particular natural lav/s or 
| principles derived from natural law. The nineteenth 
century Englishman Jeremy Bentham uncovered the super- 
; ficiality of natural law doctrine when he wrote, "A 
| great multitude of people are continually talking of 
the law of nature; and then they go on giving you their 
sentiments, you are to understand are so many chapters 
j and sections of the law of nature."''
The components of the principle of state equality, 
like the whole of naturalist interpretations of law, are 
also based on unsound premises. The concept of the 
state of nature with its implication that men and/or 
states bring with them into society certain primordial 
rights inherent in their personality and that these 
rights form the basis for a legal system is, according 
to J. L. Brierly, absurd. He said that a "legal right 
is a meaningless phrase unless v/e first assume the
6^Schwarzenberger, ojd. cit., p. 12.
^Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legisla­
ture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879) as quoted in Coplin, 
op. cit., p. 16.
'
existence of a legal system from which it gets its
validity."^ 8 Edwin Dickinson noted that even if rights
such as equality were conceivably an essential attribute
of the theoretically perfect state, "the really important
consideration is the way in which the law of nations re-
39« gards actually existing states. y The theory of the 
: state of nature also implies that international or inter- 
; personal relations is less important, or less natural, 
i than the individuality of the man or the state. In 
I reality, however, individuals and states do not exist 
in isolation but live in constant interaction with 
| society. Admittedly, an atomistic view of man in society 
; is more plausible than the same view of states in society 
j because it seems to give a philosophical justification 
i to the idea that human personality has certain claims 
I in society and it has been these claims which have 
assisted in the development of human liberty. On the 
other hand, however, a stat'e cannot afford to press its 
claims in the same manner as an individual because of 
the overwhelming difference in power between a state 
! and an individual. A small state which is content on 
paving its way in the world without relating itself to 
other, more powerful nations risks economic and political
^Brierly, ojd. cit., p. 50.
^Dickinson, ojd. cit., p. 148.
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catastrophe. A nation which refuses to trade and to 
enter the world bargaining process stifles its oppor­
tunity to know economic equality. Also, it is less 
plausible to apply this atomistic view of the nature 
of the social bond to states because a state represents 
only itself. As Brierly said, the need today is not
for separateness for individual, states, but "for a
40strengthening of the social bond between them..."
Finally, the concept of the state of nature is a denial 
of the possibility of evolution in international rela­
tions. 'When it claims that states bring such rights 
as independence and equality into society, it fails to 
acknowledge that the attribution of these rights to 
states is merely a stage in a historical process. Until 
the last fifty years, states were not regarded as in­
dependent or equal and it is naive to think that the 
development so evident in the first half of the twenti­
eth century has stopped. The real hope for international 
relations is a movement towards the closer interdependence 
of states and, therefore, "away from the state of things
which this doctrine would stabilize as though it were
41part of the fixed order of things."
The analogy between natural persons and states 
as international persons, another concept inherent in
4-0 i-Brierly, op. cit., p. r?0.
^Brierly, op. cit., p. 51.
natural equality, is as equally mythological as the 
concept of the state of nature. About the only similar­
ity between natural and international persons is that 
both have a legal personality; nevertheless, even this
42admission is not granting much credence to the theory. 
The analogy implies that states use the same criterion 
as individuals in the process of decision-making and 
that individual ethics, which includes such ideas as 
human equality, coincide with international ethics 
which, according to the naturalist, demands state equal­
ity. Smil Brunner, a prominent twentieth century theolo­
gian and Christian ethicist, indicates, however, that 
international ethics, or social ethics, differs from 
personal ethics inasmuch as they apply to collective 
institutions and not to individual persons and that 
intra and international decision-makfers are not free 
to decide for themselves but are bound to the values
43and goals of the state or international organization.
It follows from the dichotomy between personal and 
social ethics that state equality in international re­
lations does not necessarily result from the demand of
43
ILODickinson, on. cit., p.. 150.
1 Brunner, "In Search of an International 
Ethos," Theory and Practice of International Relations, 
ed. David S. McLellan, William C. Olson and Fred A. 
Sondermann (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1961), p.. 516.
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human equality within the state. A state could, 
conceivably grant full civil and political rights to 
its citizens, yet the state could stand in a position 
of military and economic inequality to the rest of the 
society of nations. Also, international ethics does 
not imply state equality on the same basis as personal 
ethics implies individual equality. Individual equality 
in democratic systems, for example, could imply a one 
man, one vote standard in the governmental process. If 
this standard for individual equality were applied to 
international relations, as it was during the Hague 
Conference of 1.907 when a scheme for establishing an 
international court of justice was wrecked by the refusal 
of some of the smaller states to accept anything less 
than equal representation for all states on the court, 
the development of international law, in general, and 
of international organizations, in particular, would be 
stifled because of an unrealistic leveling of nations 
which have unequal power structures and economic 
potential.^ Kooijmans criticized Wilfried Schumann's 
attempts to place state equality on the same basis as 
individual equality by saying:
He accepts the legal personality of the individual 
in international law and examines it more closely 
and in a most interesting manner, attaching great 
value to the co-operation and co-determination 
of the individual" in international lav/. He observes
^See Brierly, on. cit., pp. 132-133.
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that this co-operation is chiefly dependent upon the 
manner in which it is guaranteed to the individual 
in the national sphere. All this leads Schaumann 
to the conclusion that equality of states can only 
then be fully realized if the state-communities have 
been built up according to the principle of self- 
determination and in their structure give evidence 
of an order that does not only give due consideration 
to the individual, but also to the various groups 
existing within the state. This means in concreto 
that equality in international law can only attain 
its full content with regard to those states that 
have accepted the democratic system in the i'/estern
sense. 5^
Kooijman1s perceptive statement indicates another
flaw in the use of the analogy for constructing a theory
of natural equality . Basically, natural law doctrines
are products of a Western society and, consequently, it
becomes easy for a naturalist to identify the standards
of state equality with a Western oriented democracy based
on the equality of the individual. Such interpretations
do not identify with a non-Western world because it
"does not share the, ultimately religious values of
Judaism and Christianity from which the deductive systems
of Western naturalist thinkers of the sixteenth and
46seventeenth centuries stem."
The mythicizing of the doctrine of natural 
equality is most evident by its failure to conform to 
the basic ten^s of a sociological perspective of
^Kooijmans, op. cit., pp. 255-256. 
^Schwarz enberger, on. cit. , p. 152.
46
international lav/.. First, the doctrine is unrelated to 
political and social realities. Naturalists must realize 
that legal systems are particular legal systems, "related 
to particular communities and to particular social and 
political structures, and composed of particular norms
47determined and enforced through particular institutions."
Hence, what actually takes place in the real world
is split with situations described as big or little,
powerful and weak, rich and poor, and these situations
cannot be divorced from the self-centered participants
in the political process regardless of whether these
participants are individuals or nations. "It is a long
jump," according to Kaplan, "from the general necessity
for a legal system to a particular one, from the abstract
necessity of norms to particular rules and from the ideal
48rule to workable law-rules." Simply propounding the 
principle of state equality deduced from a natural law 
and discovered through human reason does not bring a 
theoretical manifesto closer to realism where a viable 
system of law can be fashioned. Also, naturalists often 
fail to describe how their principle can be enforced. 
Enforcement and human intuition are not synonymous, es­
pecially v/hen an interpretation of intuition is as varied 
as types of individuals. Funck-Brentano recognized this
^Kaplan, ojd. cit., p. 61.
jy OKaplan, on. cit., p. 61..
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problem faced by the naturalists when he said:
Civil and political equality among the subjects 
of a single state may be conceived in a way to es­
tablish equality and guarantee its practice; but 
among states there is no public authority; equality 
has no other foundation and no other guarantee than 
the customs of nations, differences in national 
character, intellectual culture, moral progress, 
political traditions, productivity and finally, of 
geographic situation destroy all real equality withstates.^
The above statement was made in the 1870's. Two 
world wars, the Communist movement, the horrors of Belsen 
and Auschwitz, the fate of Hiroshima, and the "principled" 
action of intervention in Hungary serve, however, as a 
contemporary addendum to 5’unck-Brentano ’ s analysis and 
reminds the naturalists that their unrealistic espousal 
of state equality overemphasizes stability to the point 
that it becomes inert. Hans J. Morgenthou's idea that 
international law is primarily a static social force 
which disguises a policy of the status quo is applicable 
to the doctrine of natural equality, although, as indica­
ted in Chapter I, it unduly condemns the whole of interna­
tional lav/. The doctrine implies that inequality is a 
matter of fact while equality is a matter of law. Yet, 
when this rationale is used, as it was during the "Euro­
peanized" balance of power system of the last century, the 
law is crystallized around the prevailing order of inter­
national relations. When pressed for an explanation between
^Funck-Brentano, Precis du droit des gens (Paris, 
1877), as quoted in Dickinson, on. cit., p. 133.
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factual inequalities and legal equality, publicists, 
according to Dickinson, appeal to reason, although 
"reason...is only the publicists' opinion as to what the 
law ought to be."-' Reason fails to serve as a catalyst 
in the development of international lav;. It only per­
petuates an ideal and immobile legal system. Theory must 
bear some relation to practice; otherwise, theory becomes 
a static set of principles which fail to evolve with 
the changing structure of international relations. 
"International law," asserts Gaston Friedmann, "can no 
longer be regarded as one body of principles, rather it
is a general description of various patterns and levels
51of international legal relations..."'"
Third, the naturalists are also guilty of wrapping 
their doctrine of state equality in moral absolutes.
Rather than achieving a practical system of ethics by 
combining their moral values with a combination of legal 
processes and political and social realism, naturalists 
attempt to force political inequalities into inflexible 
molds by appealing to a myhtological state of nature or 
to an erroneous analogy between individuals and states. 
Consequently, political and social realities are crushed 
under the weight of naive idealism. Often, as Friedmann 
notes, even the espousal of what ought to be is a
5°Dickinson, op. cit., p. 57.
-^Friedmann, ojd. cit., p. 567.
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disguise of a particular political or legal philosophy.
Even in Grotius1 time, this dilemma of postulating moral 
absolutes in a world deeply divided by conflicts of 
national interests and social values was obvious. Grotius, 
a Dutchman, represented his nation's best interests by 
propounding the freedom of the seas as a principle of 
natural law. Yet, at the same time, John Selden, an 
Englishman, represented his nation's interests by assert­
ing that natural law permitted private and public 
dominion of the seas, A recent example of the use of 
natural law to support a contentious position in a 
basically political controversy is F.A. Mann's assertion 
that the payment of prompt and adequate compensation in
the cases of nationalization of foreign industry is a
52principle of natural law. Inevitably, such stretching
of natural law principles breeds a contempt for the high
moral values which they have traditionally represented.
With the constant struggle of divergent philosophies and
values in international relations, it requires, as
Friedmann says, "a remarkable degree of self-assurance
to know that one's own political philosophy, whether
implemented in a majority or a minority of legal systems,
represents the order of God or Nature, while the rest of
55mankind stands condemned."
^Friedmann, o£. cit., pp. 75 and 73. 
"'''Friedmann, ojd. cit., p. 79*
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In summary, the doctrine of natural equality is 
a myth. It offers little insight for the creation of 
particular legal systems grounded in political and social 
reality. It remains in a state of inertia which fails 
to respond to changes in the structure of international 
relations. It propounds moral absolutes which fail to 
construct realistic means to achieve ethical ends.♦
CHAPTER III
THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEGAL EQUALITY OF STATES
As natural law doctrine fell into greater 
disrepute, the role of political factors in international 
relations increased. States, under nationalist pressure, 
more openly followed policies of power and, consequently, 
a "necessary" law based on human reason and separated 
from political realities ceased to be a viable means of 
analyzing law. During the seventeenth century, however, 
there was a tendency to dissociate the law of nations 
from the law of nature and to regard it as nothing more 
than the rules emanating from agreements between 
sovereign states.1 Charles De Visscher says, "The
1The legal disassociation from naturalism and the 
identification with agreements between states, or state 
wills, is termed "positivism." For the purposes of this 
chapter, it is necessary to note that a positivist ap­
proach to the doctrine of state equality is usually 
designated as the "legal equality of states," and, norm­
ally, the type of positivism referring to legal equality 
is voluntaristic positivism. (See footnote number 2 in 
Chapter I for a brief explanation of the different types 
of positivism, including voluntaristic positivism.) Hence, 
when this chapter uses the term "legal equality," it 
refers to a voluntaristic positivism and its conception 
of the doctrine. For examples of the use of the term 
"legal equality," see: P. J. Baker, "The Doctrine of 
Legal Equality of abates," The British Year Book of 
International Lav;. IV (1923-1924), pp. 1-21; Philip C. 
Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1948), pp. 26-36; P.. H. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of 
Le^al Equality of Slates (Leyden, Netherlands: A.
Syt'hoff, 1964j, pp.. 126-151.
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characteristic of sued: thought was an attitude, not of
negation, but of scientific indifference touching the
existence of an objective order superior to the lav; es-
2tablished by human will."
Richard Zouche was one of the first publicists 
who foreshadowed this tendency toward positivism. While 
serving as a Professor of Civil Law in Oxford University
and a judge of the Court of Admiralty in 1650, he wrote
3 TTthe first manual on the positive law of nations. He 
recognized the supremacy of positive or conventional lav/ 
over the natural by deducing the law between nations 
from the customary practices of nations and from written 
agreements. He made no attempt to elaborate on the 
doctrine of the natural equality of states. Rather, he 
recognized both inequalities of sovereignty and pre­
cedence and these inequalities of legal capacity, he
4-believed, had the force of lav/.
Later in the seventeenth century, Samuel Rachel 
and J. W*. Textor also espoused an international law 
developed "by the consent or agreement, either expressly 
or tacitly given, of many free nations, whereby for the 
sake of utility they are mutually bound to one another."''
2De Visscher, ojd. cit., pp. xi, 50-51.
^See Richard Zouche Juris et .iudicit feciales, sive 
juris inter gens, 1650.
^Dickinson, 0£>. cit., pp. 91-92.
^Samuel Rachel De .jure gentium, para. 91, 208 as
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This conception c£ the law of nations was completely 
arbitrary and at variance with natural lav/ because it 
might, on the basis of consent or treaties among nations, 
establish as legally just a legal precedent v/hich would 
be condemned by conscience. Rachel and Textor, while 
apparently regarding the natural equality of states, 
assumed that natural equality could be modified by the 
positive law of nations.^
One of the leading proponents of positivism 
during the eighteenth century and often regarded as the 
father of modern positivism was Johann Jakob Moser. He 
rejected the law of nature and natural equality and, like 
his predecessors, derived the law of nations from custom 
and treaties. He was the first publicist , however, who 
championed an absolute equality based on sovereignty, 
although this absolute equality was limited to fully 
sovereign states.
A state that is independent, that is, one over 
which no other state or ruler has any authority, is 
called sovereign... Independence gives equal rights.
As regards the rights resulting from independence 
all fully sovereign states are equal to one another; , 
on the other hand, semi-sovereign states are unequal 
to soverieng.^
While Moser rejected natural equality, he, 
according to P. H. Kooijmans, owed much of his thinking
^Dickinson, on. cit., p. 92.
?Johann Jakob Moser Versuch des newesten Buropai- 
sc'hen Volkerrechts in Friedens-und Kriegsten i, 1 as 
quoted in Dickinson, op. cit., p. 94.
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on sovereign equality to natural lav/. The existence of 
states in a state of nature, without a higher authority 
to which the states are subject, logically leads to the 
notion of sovereignty in the sense that each state is 
master of its own affairs*. Hence, while Moser abandons 
a naturalistic interpretation of state equality, he does 
retain the concept of state equality and equates it 
with sovereignty. For Kooijmans, the principle of state 
sovereignty is the most important basis for the legal 
equality of states. He says, "If sovereignty is con­
sidered to be the essence of the state, at least with
respect to the legal sphere, the conclusion may easily
8be drawn that states are equal."
Yet, to suggest that legal equality depends on 
sovereignty is speaking only in generalities. The
QKooijmans, on. cit.., pp. 90 and 216, Kooijmans 
says that a modern nation of state equality is also con­
nected with sovereignty. "Whether construed as a funda­
mental right of the state, as an attribute of sovereignty, 
or as a fundamental principle of international law,...we 
always find that the principle of equality is very closely 
linked up with sovereignty." (Kooigmans, op. cit., p. 91.) 
Although the concept of sovereignty equality originated in 
the eighteenth century, the term "sovereign equality" was 
first ennunciated in Paragraph 4 of the Four-Power Declara­
tion on General Security adopted at the Moscow Conference 
on November 1, 1943. It had thereafter been embodied in 
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and ultimately in Article
2, Paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter. United 
Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States (A/AC. 119/1.6,
Nov. 16, 1964), p ..148. See also Appendix A.
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general notion of sovereignty says nothing about the 
substance of state equality, therefore, for one to under­
stand the components of legal equality, he must first
understand what individual theorists mean by sovereignty.'
While the publicists writing before the First 
World War did not all interpret the principle of legal 
equality in the same manner, they did believe that state 
sovereignty was the essence of this equality.10 Their 
conception of sovereignty was similar to Hegel's in that 
the state is the highest power on earth, is perfection 
personified and, consequently, is sovereign and in­
dependent in its relations with other states. No grada­
tion in legal personality among states is possible since 
this would conflict with a state's absolute sovereignty 
and since this absolute sovereignty admits no higher 
authority which could command such gradation. This in­
dependence can only be restrained by the will of the 
state itself. A state's relationship to another state 
is often expressed through treaties which ought to be
observed although this intended observation, according 
to Hegel, is not grounded in reality. Reality is real­
ized only by a state's will expressed in sovereign
%ooijmaE, 0£. cit..., p. 127.
10Kooigman's indicates that while Friedrich von 
Martens considered legal equality as an attribute of the 
state, Charles Calvo, Georg Jellinek, and Paul Heilborn 
considered it a fundamental principle in international 
law. (Kooijmans, oj>. cit.., p. 127.)
9
; freedom, and the only criterion by which to determine 
j whether a state wills to obey or disobey treaty obliga­
tions is the demand of the state's welfare at a particular
. . 11 | time.
Since states are related to one another as auton­
omous entities and so as particular will on which 
the very validity of treaties_depends, and since the 
particular will of the whole is in content a will 
for its own welfare pure and simple, it follows that 
welfare is the highest law governing the relation 
of one state to another. 12
Strictly adhering to the notion of the state's
 ^will, but desiring to avoid the consequence of Hegelian i 7
: absolutism in order to come to a legal system for inter-I
j national intercourse, Georg Jellinek introduced during
■ the 18&0's the term "self-limitation." This concept 
implies that a state's consent is necessary in order for 
: the state to be legally bound and once the state is 
legally bound, it cannot withdraw from its obligation 
: by altering its will. The creation of an obligation 
: restrains the will of a state, yet this obligation is 
i  not imposed by an authority higher than the state since 
; such an authority is non-existent in international 
' society, but; by the individual state's recognition of 
the necessity of certain acts in the common interest. A
11Kooi0mans, 0£. cit., pp. 128-129.
12G.. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. 
T. M., Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 214, para, 
j 336.
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particular norm is given legal validity only by the 
recognition of that norm by the will of the state in con­
cert with the plurality of the declared individual state 
wills. Kooijmans notes, however, that since the norms 
applying in international society have no legal validity 
until there is recognition by the states, "it is incom­
prehensible that they should continue to apply and remain
real legal rules, if the states should change their will
15upon which this recognition is based." Caught between 
the search for a higher objective order and respect for
14-sovereignties, Jellinek ultimately defers to tne latter.
Heinrich Triepel recognized Jellinek's dilemma and 
attempted during the 1920's to offer an approach which 
replaced the idea of the will of the individual state with 
the notion of the superior will, a will shared by all states 
for a common objective. This superior will, or common will, 
was supposedly different'from Jellinek*s theory which 
implied an accidental concurrence on the declared indiv­
idual state wills.. Triepel's notion of a superior 
will bound the individual state, and consequently, the 
superior will could not be affected by a subsequent change 
in the will of the state. Triepel's dual dilemma, how­
ever, was that, first, he could not explain the common 
will without connecting it with the will of the state
■^Kooijmans, o p . cit., pp.. 131-152.
^De Visscher, op. cit., p. 50.
itself. Is Kooijmans says, "...the common will is of the
same time its own will..." Second, since there was such
a close connection between the individual state will and
the common will, he failed to explain adequately why a
common will would continue to bind a state even after a
15state had changed its will. Thus, Triepel's theory 
became nothing more than tautology.
While Jellinek and Triepel attempted to avoid 
Hegelian notions of absolute sovereignty, they prpounded 
theories which, in effect, did little to restrain state 
sovereignty. Ultimately, as indicated above, their the­
ories retained the belief in the state's will and its 
ability to either validate or invalidate law. Regardless 
of the theories' inabilities, they held important con­
siderations for the doctrine of legal equality. The 
sovereignty of a state, best expressed in the will of 
the state, is as valid as the sovereignty of another state. 
There is no gradation of sovereignty among states since, 
as Hegel said, this would conflict with the states' 
common claim to absolute, unimpaired sovereignty and since 
this absolute sovereignty among states precludes the cre­
ation of a higher authority which would command this 
gradation. Not wanting to equate the sovereignty of a 
state with its power, however, Jellinek and Triepel
58
■^Kooijmans, on. cit., pp. 152-134.
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asserted that a state is limited by the rights it
recognizes in another legal person, the foreign state.
A foreign state exists as a legal personality only after
it is recognized by the other state, although once it is
recognized, it will function as an equal in lav; with the
other sovereign states. Differences in power, territory,
and population are irrelevant because the recognition of
a state is a recognition of its sovereignty. One of the
first principles that can be deduced from this absolute
legal equality 6f states is that a state cannot be forced
against its will to accept a certain legal rule. This
implies that a majority decision cannot bind a state
which did not consent to the decision. Hence, the only
valid process of establishing legal norms is through the
16rule of unanimity. This idea was best expressed by the 
Brazilian representative to the Second Hague Peace Con­
ference of 1907 when he was opposing the idea of priv­
ileges for the Great Powers on the proposed Permanent 
Court of Arbitration.
Sovereignty is the prime and elemental right of 
constituted and independent states. Therefore, 
sovereignty signifies equality. In theory, as in 
practice, sovereignty is absolute. It knows no 
grades. The juridical administration of lav; is a 
branch of sovereignty. If there must be among 
States a common organ of justice all States must 
have a necessity an equivalent representation.17
^Kooijmans, ojd. cit., pp. 136-138.
■^Kooijmans, 00. cit., p. 146.
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Early in the twentieth century, Georges Streit also 
identified with a positivist conception of state equality 
by asserting that regardless of the actual practice of the 
Great Powers, actuality never attains legal force until it 
is recognized by the smaller states. Although the rights 
of smaller states were continually infringed by power 
blocs, the infringement of those rights, according to 
Streit, were invalid unless the smaller states acquiesced 
in such infringement. He concluded with the idea that 
absolute legal equality was one of the foundations of 
international law. Consequently, an international organ­
ization based on legal inequality between the Great Powers 
and the small states, provided they refused to recognize 
the rule of inequality, could not exist since the organ­
ization would fail to reflect an international society 
composed of independent and sovereign powers. "No other 
kind of community is possible in the eyes of Streit and 
the positivists," says Kooijmans, "because this would 
overthrow their notion of sovereignty and their conception
of the will of the state as binding legal foundation, and
18therefore their entire conception of law."
Gleaning from the theories of Jellinek, Triepel, 
and Streit and their emphasis on equality before the lav/, 
this crater interprets the doctrine of legal equality 
of sovereign states to imply, first, an equal participation
■^Kooijmans, op. cit., pp. 14-4-145.
in the formulation of law, including the rule of unanimity, 
and second, an equal protection of the laws. These two 
tenets of legal equality, according to voluntaristic pos­
itivism, must be absolute, regardless of political 
inequalities. Thus, it is contrary to the demands of legal«
equality when the Great Powers, without obtaining the con­
sent of the smaller states, establish rules which are con­
sidered binding for the entire international society.
In order to evaluate properly the validity of the 
doctrine of legal equality, it is necessary to understand 
the political realities during the height of positivist 
theory, to contrast the realities with the two basic tenets 
of legal equality and, finally, with the aid of a sociolog­
ical perspective of international law, to determine the 
role of the doctrine in modern international law.
During the nineteenth and. the first decade of the 
twentieth centuries, international law was limited to a 
specific group of European states. These states formed 
a closed society which only explicitly admitted members, 
such as Turkey during the Peace <£ Paris of 1856. Colon­
ialism remained, in effect, outside the confines of 
international law, except when two or more competing 
European colonial powers came into conflict. As colon- 
ialization expanded, international law expanded, but its 
reach extended only to the European states which settled 
in the territories concerned. While treaties between 
powerful European states and smaller states were
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frequently observed, the primary consideration was the
smaller states' utility as military allies or as reservoirs
19of natural resources for the larger states.
Morton Kaplan notes that with respect to the major 
states during the balance of power system, the positivist 
emphasis on sovereignty conformed fairly well to the facts. 
Wo state contained such a preponderance ofpower that it 
interfered with the internal affairs of other states, plus 
the fear of military reprisal by an alliance of European 
nations prevented most nations from scorning the rule of 
non-interference. While the logical difficulties in the 
notion of absolute sovereignty were evident, they did 
not affect the concept's practical adequacy in explaining 
what took place. "The absurdity of auto-limitation as an 
explanation of international law," says Kaplan, "should 
not obscure the fact that the concept reflected the real 
needs that the community of nations' had in protecting the 
myth of sovereignty."
Nevertheless, during this same period, there was 
little validity for the doctrine of sovereign equality 
which, in theory, allowed no gradation among states un­
less such gradation was recognized by both large and 
small states. Political and military gradation, however, 
was the rule of the day, for it was the large European
"^Kooijmans, op. cit., pp. 91-92.
20Kaplan, on. cit., p. 37.
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powers which made or redressed the balance of power 
system and whose independence was essential to the main­
tenance of the minimum number of nations necessary to 
"balance." Any "sovereign" status for smaller states in 
Europe and, after the Monroe Doctrine, in Latin America 
was guaranteed by the major nations for two reasons.
First, the flexibility in the balance of power system 
prevented any viable division of smaller European coun­
tries. Second, the acquisition of these smaller states 
was hampered due to the problems of assimilation into 
different national cultures. The rulers of the smaller 
states, on the other hand, acknowledged the fact that 
the protection of their sovereignty was the result of 
the balance of power system which they could not influence 
to a noticeable extent. Yet, they also acknowledged the 
fact that the power system worked to their advantage.
While avoiding dominion by any particular nation and 
scrupulously respecting the sovereignty of the larger
nations, they also insisted upon their own status as
21"sovereign" states.
During this period, sovereignty for small states 
was not related to nationalism or self-determination.
The dichotomy between the hegemony of the great nations 
and the rest of the world was taken for granted and 
equality of rights and freedom from intervention was
PiKaplan, or), cit., p. 38.
applied only to the civilized or Christian states. While 
any form of intervention in the administration of states 
which were of strategic military and political importance 
was intolerable, intervention in other parts of the 
world was tolerable and might even enhance a strong state's 
national interets. It was not uncommon for European 
| powers to transport their culture, complete with relig- 
. ious values and political philosophy, to those parts of 
the world where intervention was "legitimate." Con­
sequently, through a desire for economic gain and for 
an increase of national capabilities, the colonial powers 
relegated large areas of Asia, the Middle East, and 
| Africa to an inferior status in the international system.
In effect, the majority of the world's population and 
territory constituted a source of difficulty because, 
according to the large nations, it was not capable of 
participating responsibly in international politics and 
because it lacked modern political systems. By placing 
certain of these areas under protectorate, individual 
European powers prevented other major nations from
conquering them and also ridded potential sources of
22instability in international politics.
Even after the termination of the balance of power 
era, the double standard imposed by the Great Powers on 
the smaller states remained. The League of Nations 
pp
j 64
Kaplan, on. cit., p.. 95.
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failed to provide legislative authority to change the 
status quo. In fact, Article 10 of the Covenant explic­
itly required the maintenance of the territorial status 
quo established by the peace treaties:
’ The Members of the League undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members of the League. In case of any such aggression 
or in the case of any threat or danger of such aggres­
sion the Council shall advise upon the means by which 
this obligation shall be fulfilled. 3^
Thus, without establishing political organs that could 
legislate peaceful changes, the League required its 
Members to perpetuate a juridical status quo against 
forcible change. Nevertheless, the League recognized 
Poland's forcible change of its border with Lithuania.
The primary reasons for this violation of the Covenant 
was that Prance, one of the major powers in the League's 
membership, had a great interest in a strong Poland 
which could weild a contervailing influence on Germany.
The League's ruling elite knew that territorial infringe­
ment of a small state by a large state rarely involved 
the threat of war. In reality, therefore, Article 10 
was restricted to aggression which, by affecting the
24interests of the major states, created a threat of \^ ar.
Specifically, the contrast between the realities 
of international relations and the two basic tenets
^League of Nations, Covenant, Article 10. 
^Kaplan, op. cit., p. 287.
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inherent in the doctrine of legal equality stirred 
additional doubts in the credibility cf the doctrine.
The notion of the equal participation of states in the 
formulation of bw survived only as a myth. Then, as 
now, states, technically speaking, participated equally 
in the drafting of the treaties which they signed and 
in the practices from which customary lav/s emerged. In 
reality, however, the strong state left a much deeper 
imprint on a treaty than its weaker partner and a multi­
lateral treaty was largely the product of compromise 
among the major powers.. While customary lav/ was derived 
from general practice, the practice was considered gen­
eral if most of the states, including all great powers,
25accepted it. It was one thing for the state to refuse
to be bound by rules of law to which it had not agreed
and quite another to participate equally in the making 
26of new rules.
The Congress of Vienna in 1815 best epitomized 
the dominance of the Great Powers in the formulation of 
lav/. There, the large European powers assembled not only 
to legislate for Europe, but for the world. The Congress 
marked a formal recognition of the political system which
25-'W- W„. Kulski, international Politics in a 
Revolutionary Age (New York: J. B. Lippincott, Co., 1964), 
p. 44-9.
Penwick, 0£. cit., p. 225.
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was to govern international relations for the rest of the 
century. International law had to conform to the reali­
ties of an international political mold filled with 
competitive, suspicious, and opportunistic European 
nations which insisted on flexibility of alignment., For
all practical purposes, according to Kaplan, "interna-
29tional lav/ was Europeanized."
Throughout the nineteenth and during the twentieth 
centuries, the Great Powers did not hesitate to settle 
specific problems which involved their common interests 
by meeting periodically to legislate rules which had the 
force of lav/. The Congress of Paris in 1856, which con­
sisted, for all practical purposes, of the major nations,
28met to consider new rules of war of sea.- The result 
of the meeting was a declaration which, like most other 
declarations of that period, stated, "...the present 
Declaration is not and shall not be binding except 
between these Powers who have acceded or shall accede 
to it." While being an example of general international 
law, it was binding only on those states who had partici­
pated in its formulation. The Berlin Congresses of 1878
2^Kaplan, on. cit., p. 62.
28Fenwick, 0£. cit., p. 225.
and 1885 acted as de facto executive bodies during the 
partitioning of Africa and the reconstruction of the 
Balkan states. The Conference of Algericas of 1906 
legislated on Moroccan problems and the London Conference
of Ambassadors intervened in the Balkan situation in 1913
29and emancipated Albania.
The Paris Peace Conference of 1919, composed of the 
United States, Prance, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan 
and which officially called themselves the "Principled 
Allied and Associated Powers" while designating the 
other participating states as "Powers with limited 
interests," was conducted primarily by the Big Pive to 
the complete negation of the doctrine of legal equality.
The voting procedure, established by the major nations, 
gave five votes to each of the five Great Powers; three 
each to Belgium, Brazil and Serbia; two each to Australia, 
Canada, China, and Greece, Eedjaz, India, Poland, Port­
ugal, Rumania, Siam, South Africa, and Czac'hslovakia; 
one each to the remainder of the states. The Commissions 
and the plenary meetings were planned and directed by the 
larger states. The actual programming was undertaken by 
the Council of Ten composed of the five prime ministers 
and the five foreign ministers of the Big Pive and, 
consequently, the plenary sessions were little more than.
68
2^ Penwick, op. cit., p. 223.
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listening sessions sponsored by the Council. As Robert 
Lansing, then Secretary of State of the United States, 
said, "It was medieval rather than modern, despotic 
rather than democratic. It was in one sense a farce, 
but in another, it was a tragedy.
On September 29, 1938, Great Britain, France, and 
Germany signed the Agreement Concerning the Sudeten- 
German Territory in Munich. The preamble of the Agreement 
stated that the signatories acknowledged the cessation of 
the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia to Germany and "have 
agreed on the folio.-; ing terms and conditions governing 
the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, 
and by this agreement they each hold themselves respon­
sible for the steps necessary to seciire its fulfillment." 
The nation which had suffered the loss of a fourth of its 
territory to Germany was not invited to the Conference 
nor was it consulted during the signing of the Agreement. 
The loss of Czechoslovakia's territory made it susceptible
to German agression, which occurred only six months after
31the Conference.
During and after World War II, the 1943 Moscow 
Conference, the Yalta Conference, and the meetings of 
Dumbarton Oaks, the linage of the Great Powers concept 
continued and today it is reflected in the structure of
^Korowicz, 0£. cit., pp. 259-260.
^Korowicz, op. cit., pp. 268-269.
j the Security Council of the United Nations.
The rule of unanimity also stood at variance with 
j political reality. The League of Nations, while affirming
-
; the rule in its Covenant, benefitted from the mistakes
!
which the Hague Conference of 1907 made in attempting 
! to incorporate the small states' demands for unanimity
; in the proposed Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice and
7)2of the International Prize Court. C. Wilfred Jenks 
j notes that "the League grew primarily by outgrowing the 
principle of unanimity proclaimed by the Covenant.
Through a series of constitutional conventions, the rule 
; was relaxed. New powers and functions providing for 
| majority decisions were given the Council, one of the 
J League's major organs which consisted of both permanent 
| and elected members and which dealt with the League's 
| most pressing political problems. The cooperative action 
implemented by an individual state's response to its 
obligations under the Covenant no longer required unan­
imity, as was best exemplified by the application of 
sanctions during the Ethiopian war. Jenks says:
In a variety of subtle ways the formal requirement 
of unanimity was tempered by "the very huamn desire 
not to be isolated, which prevents a real insistence
32Korowicz, ojd. cit., p. 251.
33C. Wilfred Jenks, "Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted 
! Voting, Special and Simple Majorities and Consensus as Modes 
of Decision in International Organizations," Cambridge 
Essays in International Law, ed. R. Y. Jennings (London: 
Stevens and Co., 1965), p . 49.
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on the principle of unanimity by small minorities 
on ordinary occasions." It was this tempering and 
mellowing of the principle which made the League 
as effective as it was, but the principle neverthe­
less handicapped the League throughout in seeking 
budgetary resources adequate for the proper discharge 
of its responsibilities and doomed it to frustration 
at vital points in its history, notably at the crisis 
of the Manchurian disput^ which marked the beginning 
of its decline and fail.:
The rule of unanimity continued to be used and even today
| it forms the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and of the Organizations for Economic Co-operation
and Development, although Jenks notes that the rule of
unanimity is geiH?ally considered obsolete and can operate
only within a "relatively homogeneous organization with a
35highly developed sense of common purpose." '
The notion of the equal protection of the laws 
for all states, the second basic tenet inherent in legal 
equality, also existed only as a myth. It was this con­
cept which was diametrically opposed to the events pre­
ceding the First World War. Theoretically, the sanctions of 
international law held good for the protection of both 
weak and strong, but the principle's inherent shortcomings 
began to appear when the best sanctions were inadequate 
and an injured state was left to its own limited resources 
to defend itself against attack or to maintain its claims 
against a much stronger state. China's role as a pawn
34Ibid.
Ibid., p. 50. It is not within this chapter's 
purpose to present alternating means of voting, however,
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during the Russo-Japanese war, for example, was considered 
by international public opinion as being relatively un­
important. In 1910, when Korea was deprived of its very
existence as an international person, the "protective"
56qualities of international law were ineffective."
Following the First World War and during the implementa­
tion of the provisions of the League Covenant concerning 
the protection of minorities, the Great Powers compelled 
fourteen other states, but not themselves, to accept the 
Covenant's obligations. Consequently, the Great Pov/ers 
did not act for the benefit of the international organi­
zation, but only for themselves. Noting the violation 
of both the equality of rights in individual relations 
of States and the legal equality of States, iiorowicz says:
The eaual protection by international law of the 
sovereignty of the contracting parties was refused 
to the States subjected to the regime of the inter­
national protection of minorities. Restrictions 
were imoosed on the sovereignty of one contracting 
party by the other^contracting party in behalf of the 
former's citizens.^/
Japan's invasion of Manchuria in the 1930's was a 
flagrant violation of the equal protection of the laws, 
but the League remained idle. Four years later came the
for an excellent discussion ofalternate voting 
procedures, see Ibid., pp. 52-65; also Lorowicz, op. cit., 
pp. 265-266.
/r
^ !F Gnwick, 01^ • c m 5 ]? • 221 •
^Korowicz, on. cit., p. 268.
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attack upon Abssynia and this produced a chain reaction
of sudden absorption of one "sovereign state" into 
38another. The absorption of smaller states by the Axis 
Powers during the Second World War and the failure of the 
United Nations to provide for the equal protection of 
the laws in Hungary, East Germany , Korea, Cuba, and South 
Africa provide more recent examples of the principle's 
infringement.
Contrasted to the domestic situation where the 
state guarantees equal protection of law for the rights 
of its individual citizens, the international situation 
gives no recourse to a super state institution. Conse­
quently, as Kulski says, "the equal protection of the 
rights of the state, which international law recognizes, 
cannot be enforced against the bad faith of a strong law
7)Qbreaker." Since treaties, like domestic contracts, add 
and subtract rights, states have unequal rights and duties 
under treaty law. A commercial treaty, for example, 
confers on the signatories the right to import their 
goods after the payment of lower custom duties than 
those which the nonsignatories must pay. At the same 
time, however, the commercial treaty restricts their free­
dom of tariff regulation. A treaty can create both a state
^Fenwick, o£. cit., p. 222. 
^Kulski, o£. cit., p. 448.
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of inequality between the signatories and the nonsignatories 
{ and even for the signatories themselves. A commercial 
' treaty constructed between an advanced and a ne\'/, weaker 
< nation might guarantee the national treatment of their 
i respective citizens and corporations in the territory of 
i the other contracting party. Legally, the weaker nation 
| is given full reciprocity by the treaty, but in reality 
i the weaker nation is in an unequal position. While the 
| provision of "equality" yields an important concession 
i to the advanced country whose business firms operate in 
*I the underdeveloped country and guarantees the same rights 
which local businesses have, the new state finds that,
I in the name of legality, it has been placed in a disad­
vantageous position because it has no business forms in
4-0the territory of the advanced state. Perhaps a fear 
of such treaties is what motivated a Cyprion representa—
* tive to suggest that the analogy drawn with private law 
in cases of invalidation of contracts concluded under
; duress should apply to international agreements concludedI
I when two or more parties were in an unequal bargaining
• 4.. 41 ; position.
^°Kulski, 0£. cit., pp. 448-44-9.
41United Nations, General Assembly, Special Commit­
tee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
| Relations and Co—operation Among States(A/nO. 11j/L.1,
; June 24, 1964), p. 110.
Finally, in order to evaluate properly the 
validity of the doctrine of legal equality, it is nec­
essary to determine, with the aid of a sociological 
i perspective of international law, the role of the doctrine 
I in modern international law. First, the consequences of 
I the doctrine's construction of the dichotomy between 
legal equality and political inequality must be examined. 
Because voluntaristic positivism is concerned only with 
state wills, thereby excluding the ethical, political, 
and social factors which are the foundation and ultimate 
I explanation of law, it strengthens an intransigent con-
ception of sovereignty during times when vast upheavals
LlOcall for radical revision. - By failing to construct 
: its theories of legal equality from facts inherent in the 
world structure, positivism achieves results which make 
no real contribution toward the development of a viable 
world order.^ Rather than constructing a spirit of corn­
's munity, positivist theories emphasize sovereign independ­
ence and competitiveness. It stresses the idea that no 
legal system, partnership, or inequality, even if the 
inequality is based on special interests such as confer-
I ences governing the exchange of commodities grown or
^2De Visscher, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
^Kooijmans, ojd. cit.,, p. 99.
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produced only by a few states, is valid unless it is 
recognized by all states. Kooijmans notes that political 
inequality is a fact that cannot be omitted in the con­
struction of lav;. He quotes John Westlake who said:
It is true that politics are not law, but an 
adequate notion of law cannot be gained without 
understanding the society in and for which it exists 
and it is necessary for the student of international 
law to appreciate the actual position of the great 
powers...
Georg Schwarzenberger gives reasons why attention 
needs to be given to world powers. Assuming the same 
degree of lav/-abidingness as smaller states, large, more 
powerful nations have to consider a multitude of factors 
which enable them to view any topic more comprehensively 
than a small state. If the interests of the Great Powers 
are connected with more than one continent and are not 
limited to land or sea powers, then their sctensive re­
sponsibilities lead to a more remarkable balance in their 
45views.
Another conseouence of the positivist interpreta­
tion of state equality is that its fixation on legalism can 
give a nation a false sense of security. The Kellogg 
Pact, for example, made many Europeans feel secure behind 
the screen of its prohibition of all wars. The world, v/ith
44Kooijmans, on. cit., p. 99.
45^Schwarzenberger, ojd. cit., p. 29.
the exception of Germany, admired France's Maginot Line
until the French defense fortifications crumbled under
46German militarism. ' A small state's appeal to legal 
equality without a pragmatic application of political 
realities leaves the state with a meaningless principle 
without methods for its realization. Consequently, a 
state's legal security is crushed when the Great Powers 
turn the notions of the equal participation in the form­
ulation of law and the equal protection of the law to 
their own advantage.
Second, the doctrine of legal equality consists 
of a body of formal static rules. By reducing inter­
national law and, particularly, the idea of state 
equality to agreements between state wills, voluntaristic 
positivism condemned international law to immobility. 
Generally, however, positivist doctrine and its static 
posture correspond to the general spirit of the age of 
its inception. The nineteenth century, being a period 
of relative calm and prosperity, placed a high premium 
on stability.^ Georges Streit's theories on the imposs­
ibility of creating an international organization because 
of its inconsistency with an international society com­
posed of independent and sovereign powers is an example
^Kulski, on. cit., p. 450.
^'De Visscher, on. cit., p. 52.
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on nineteenth century positivist stress on stability.
Such thinking, as Friedmann suggest, discourages inquiry 
into the interrelation between the changing needs of 
society and the response of the laws. Contrary to the 
relation of natural sovereignty to international order, 
positivist doctrine tends to regard international law 
in relative isolation from the constant evolution of the 
political and social structures of international society. 
It tends to take the existing law, developed largely by 
custom and treaty, as fixed. Since it considers the 
state, which it believes to be the sole subject of inter- 
national law, also immune to internal, political and social 
transformations, it joins hands with naturalist thinking 
by discouraging "the sociological inquiry into the inter­
relation between international law and the international
49society."
Third, because of the positivist separation be­
tween law and reality and the immobility of a law develope 
through state wills, there also occurs a schism between 
law and ethics. Rather than propounding a standard of 
moral absolutes such as naturalistic theories, voluntar­
istic positivism asserts that posited legal authority
h QKooijmans, on. cit., p. 145.
^Friedmann, on. cit. , p. 76.
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emanates from the will of the state, thereby negating an
 ^0inquiry into universal moral norms."' In fact, the
logical pursuit of positivist conceptions of legal equality
leads to the antithesis of ethical ends. If sovereignty
is considered the absolute, unrestricted authority of the
state will and if, in principle, the state has complete
freedom because it is not subject to any higher authority,
then the rights of other states stand in danger of being
infringed upon. There is a reversion of the Hobbesian
idea of war of all against all because the sovereignty
51of one state excludes the sovereignty of others.-
In summary, the doctrine of legal equality, like 
its predecessor, is a myth. It stands aloof to reality.
It remains isolated from political and social change; it 
fails to offer norms for the development of cooperation 
between small new nations and large powerful ones; it 
even fails to envisage a spirit of cooperation which 
might enable the realization of state equality. It wor­
ships the sovereign will of the state at the expense oi 
■propounding a merger of reality and broad ethical ends 
for the growth of a world society.
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^Friedmann, on. cit., p. 76. 
^Kooijmans, ot). cit., pp. 128-129.
CHAPTER IV
THE NEW NATIONS AND THE DOCTRINE
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, over 
sixty nations have come into existence."' Most of these 
new nations are small, weak, and were, in most cases, 
former dependencies.. Recognizing all too well the diver­
gence of political power and economic development between 
themselves and the ret of the world, they invoke the 
doctrine of state equality as a rationale for their efforts 
to diminish these inequalities. One means by which they 
hope to obtain greater equality with the Western World is 
through the United Nations system, the primary concern of 
this chapter. For many new nations, admittance to the 
United Nations is the culmination of a victorious struggle. 
While independence itself testifies to the destruction of 
their status as an unequal in the colonial system, the 
j guarantee of their position as an independent state and
the peace required to make their independence meaningful
2can be found only in an international organization. 
"Admission into the United Nations," noted Rupert Emerson, 
"is a symbol of coming of age and of equal acceptance
^See Appendix B.
pJ. J. G.: Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian 
States and the Development of International' Law (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1961j, p. 10.
Ainto the family of nations."''
Specifically, this chapter attempts to indicate 
the direct or indirect influence of the new nations1 
application of the doctrine in the United Nations by the 
following:
(1) The membership expansion of the General Assembly 
and the utilization of the voting system to 
achieve greater representation on such committees 
as the General Committee and to obtain greater
.
political maneuverability;
.
(2) The expansion of geographical distribution and 
of the membership of the Security Council;
(3) The broadening of the membership of the Economic 
and Social Council and its Committee on Non-
.
Governmental Organizations;
(4) The opposition of the voting system of the 
financial agencies;
(5) The failure of the new nations to establish a 
Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development;
(6) The establishment of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development.
The General Assembly 
As early as the San Francisco Conference, the small
-'’Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 3*
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states campaigned to enhance the position of the General 
j Assembly vis-a-vis the Security Council. Because of the 
equality of voting power within the Assembly, the Assembly, 
they believed, was the "primary vehicle available for the
lLexertion of their influence upon world affairs." One
Turkish delegate to the Conference asserted:
The principle of the sovereign equality of states 
should have as a consequence the concentration...in 
the hands of the Assembly of all the powers relative 
to decisions bearing upon the maintenance of peaceand security.5
The decisions of the Big Five prevailed, however, and the 
Security Council retained the hegemony of power. Never-‘-
theless, the small states left the Conference with the 
firm resolve to exploit every opportunity to increase 
j the pov/er of the General Assembly which they regarded as 
"the democratic core of the organization" and as "the 
great focal point from which all other United Nations 
bodies draw their support and to which they must all look 
for ultimate guidance and support."0
Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (3rd 
ed., rev.; New York: Random House, 1964), p. 162.
K^Robert M. MacTver, The Nations and the United 
Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1959%
: pp. 78-79.
°Claude, o£. cit'.., p. 162. See also Herbert V. 
Evatt, The Task of Nations (New York: Duell, Sloan, and 
Pearce, 1949), p. 12.,
One means of strengthening the "democratic core 
of the Organization" was through giving greater universal­
ity to Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Charter which stated 
that:
Membership in the United Nations is open to all 
other peace-loving states which accept the obligations 
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment 
of the Organization, age able and willing to carry 
out these obligations.'
let, even this strategy was aborted, at least until 
1955, because of the stipulation in paragraph 2 that made 
the admission of any state subject to a "decision of the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security 
Council" and the resulting entangtoent of state admission 
with the political struggle between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. These two powers supported or rejected 
states desirous of membership by determining whether or 
not the applicants would benefit or hinder their political 
positions. Beginning in 194-7, the Soviet Union sponsored 
a series of "package proposals" whereby several states
Oin both blocs could be admitted. The Western powers, led 
by the United States, prevented the approval of these 
proposals on the ground that each membership application 
had to be judged separately with reference to the criteria 
stated in Article 4. This position was supported by an
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7'United Nations, Charter, Art. 4, para. 1.
OIt should be noted that in 194-6 the United States 
admitted the first "package" proposal, but it was defeated 
by the Soviet Union. (Claude, op. cit., p. 83.)
advisory opinion issued by the International Court of 
Justice in 1948.'' In retaliation, the Soviet Union used 
its veto power in the Security Council to defeat Western 
supported applicants. This only served, however, to 
enhance Western propaganda for the Soviet Union was guilty 
both of sponsoring unconstitutional "package proposals" 
and of misusing its veto to exclude well-qualified states. 
For awhile, the Western strategy gained support from the 
smaller states of the United Nations. Since the small 
nations were eager to strengthen their own status in the 
organization, they were sensitive to the veto as a symbol 
of inequality. Consequently, according to Inis Claude, 
they were inclined to:
...deplore its use as a bar to the admission of 
new members, to insist that the veto was not consti­
tutionally applicable to Security Council action on 
applications, and even to argue that the General 
Assembly was competant to admit new-members whether 
recommendations for admission had been approved in 
the Security Council or not.-®-®
Another advisory opinion by the International Court 
failed to endorse the attitude of the small states. It 
held that giving power to the General Assembly to control 
membership "would be to deprive the Security Council of 
an important power which has been intrusted to it by the
QClaude, on. cit., pp. 85-84. See Advisory Opinion 
of Conditions of .Admissions of New Members to the United 
Nations, May 28, 1948, International Court of Justice 
Reports, 1948, pp. 57-66.
"^Claude, op. cit., p. 84.
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Charter.n11 Alejandro Alvarez of Chile, however, made an 
acute analysis of the small dates' position when, in the 
dissent, he said:,
...if it were admitted that the right of veto could 
be freely exercised, the result might be that a State 
whose request for admission had been approved by all 
the Members of the General Assembly would nevertheless 
be unable to obtain admission to the United Nations 
because of the opposition of a single country; a 
single vote would then be able to frustrate the votes 
of all the other Members of the United Nations —  
and that would be absurd.12
■ .Regardless of the Court's decision, the smaller
states' struggle was significant "as a phase of their
persistent effort to increase the role of the General
Assembly...and thereby reduce the preponderance of the
15great powers in the United Nations."
The small states soon became unresponive to the 
American position. They realized that the obstruction 
to universality in the Assembly was caused more by a 
rejection of politically balanced group proposals rather 
than the vetoing of individual applications. They be­
lieved that any significant expression of membership 
would have to come through compromise among the large 
powers and because the large powers also shared this
Advisory Opinion on the Competance of the General 
Assembly for theAdmission of a State”to the United Nations, 
March 1950. International Court of Justice Reports,
1950, pp. 4-ii.
^ Ibid., p. 11.
"^ Claude, 00. cit., p. 85.
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attitude, a group of sixteen applications received 
favorable action in the Security Council and, subsequently, 
were approved by the General Assembly on December 14-,
141955* Since 1955» more nations have been admitted through 
group proposals and at the time of this writing the 
Assembly stands at 122.
*
Now that the General Assembly basically reflects
a universality of membership, Article 18, paragraph 1,
which states that "each member of the General Assembly
15shall have one vote" assumes great meaning.
Most of the recent additions of the Assembly are 
extremely small and politically and economically weak, 
yet under the Charter, they have as much voting power 
as the large, powerful nations. Thus, for the first 
time, many of the new nations are given a sense of equal-
i
ity, though superficial, especially in light of the obvious
!inequalities between the large and small powers in the 
J Security Council and in the financial agencies and of 
' even the persuasive influence exerted by the large nations 
on their one vote in the Assembly. In regard to the
14.Claude, on. cit., p. 85. See Appendix C.
15^Complete universality still remains unrealized 
in view of the absence of The People's Republic of China, 
North and South Viet Nam, North and South Korea, and 
East and West Germany. While subjects of interest and 
ones needing more investigation, they are beyond the 
intention of this chapter.
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Assembly, Benjamin Akzin's assertion that the “invariable
objective of the individual state is to gain the maximum
possible influence in the affairs of the organization...”
is true, particularly for the new nations which use their
equal vote as a means to press for greater representation
in such committees as the Assembly’s General Committee
16and to obtain greater political maneuverability. The 
latitude available to the new nations and their one vote 
is evidenced in the following statement:
...in the United Nations, where politics definitely 
take precedence over technical consideration, the 
General Assembly on which all members have one vote 
takes binding decisions of an organizational or pro­
cedural nature only; otherwise, it adopts mere 
recommendations. Nevertheless, these organizational 
and procedural matters include some of the greatest 
importance, such as admission of new members, sus­
pension and expulsion from membership, election to 
various bodies, budgetary decisions, and recommenda­
tions affecting peace and security.^
In 1963, during the eighteenth session of the 
General Assembly, fifty-five Asian and African states 
indirectly invoked the doctrine of the equality of states 
in the formulation of Resolution 1990. This resolution 
outlined provisions for ^ expanding the composition of the 
President of the General Assembly, thirteen Vice-Presidents
Benjamin Akzin, New States and International 
Organization, A Report to the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, Prepared by the 
International Political Science Association (Paris: UNESCO, 
1955), p. 148.
17Ibid., p. 153.
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and the Chairmen of the seven Main Committees.10 "Taking
into account the considerable increase in the membership
of the United Nations," the new nations also wanted to
construct the General Committee in such a way that it
"would insure its representative character on the basis
of a balanced geographical distribution among its 
19members." y They recommended that the number of Vice- 
Presidents on the Committee be increased to the following 
pattern:
(a) Seven representatives from Africa and Asian 
States;
(b) One representative from an Eastern European 
State;
(c) Three representatives from Latin American 
States;
(d) Two representatives from Western European 
other States;
(e) Five representatives from the permanent members of the Security Council.20
The seven Chairmen of the Main Committees would be
elected from a geographical pattern which would give the
21African and Asian states three representatives.'” Before 
voting on the resolution, several delegations made
1 ftBasically, the General Committee recommends a 
provisional agenda for General Assembly sessions. For 
j greater detail of the Committee's function, see: United 
1 Nations, Pules of Procedure of the General Assembly, Rules 
40-42.
19'United Nations, Official Records of tfae General 
Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, Vol. Ill, Agenda 
Items 81, 82, 12 (December 17, 1963), (New York, 1963),
| pp.. 11-12.
20Ibid., p. 12.
21Ibid., p^ 12.
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comments, all of which praised the new Afro-Asian states 
for their efforts to gain greater representation in the 
United Nations. The Soviet Union's N„ T* Fedorenko said:■
The inclusion of this question, put forward by a 
large group of African and Asain countries in the 
agenda of the General Assembly's eighteenth session 
was due to the legitimate efforts of the voting inde­
pendent States of Africa and Asia to assert and con­
solidate their equality and sovereignty by securing an 
equal voice not only in the United Nations itself, but 
also in its main organs.
The General Assembly passed the resolution unan­
imously, 111-0-0. Of tne 111 votes, 57 were from African 
and Asian states and this number plus the votes from the
Latin American states would have been more than sufficient
23for the necessary two-thirds majority. This in itself 
gives, evidence of the effects which can be achieved 
through a unified effort to capitalize on the one nation- 
one vote system of the Assembly. Following the vote,
I B. C. Mishra of India said:
The negotiations have been successful because the 
African-Asian delegations were solid on this question. 
Their solidarity did not come out of any desire, to 
use a colloquMism, to gang up against other dele­
gations of the Assembly. The solidarity was born 
out of a belief of the African-Asian delegations that 
their cause was just and that the time was ripe to 
remedy the situation arising out of inequitable and 
unbalanced representation in the principle Councils 
of the United Nations, and their proposals were fair 
and equitable to all groups.24
PP
“United Nations, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. Ill, 
1285 Meeting (A/PV. 1262-1285, December 17, 1963) (New York, 
1963), p. 13.
25Ibid., p. 17.
24Ibid., p. 19.
The new nations also see the voting system as an
opportunity to gain greater political maneuverability and
in this way "compensate for some of the legal disabilities
and factual advantage in which they find themselves as
25compared to the major Powers." The African and Asian
states hold more votes than any other grouping within
the General Assembly and for questions requiring a
majority vote, as indicated in Article IS, paragraph 3
of the Charter, the Afro-Asian positions, assuming there
26; is unity within these new nations, can prevail. Even
for a two-thirds majority required for "important questions" 
as outlined in Article 18, paragraph 2, the Afro-Asian 
states can dominate Assembly decision-making provided 
they influence the vote of a small but necessary per­
centage of other nations. The large powers, particularly 
the two blocs represented by the Soviet Union and the 
United States, must obtain the support of these new 
| nations if their resolutions are to pass. Thus, new
^Akzin, op. cit., p. 154.
Of- It should be noted that Afro-Asian nations are 
never completely unified on all issues. Factions occur 
among these nations on such subjects, for example, as 
deciding what measures whould be implemented to stabilize 
' the Middle East following the June, 1967, war between the 
Arab nations and Israel. Even among the African nations, 
unity is often missing. See John H. Spencer, "Africa at 
the U. N„: Some Observations," Independent Black Africa 
(Chicago;. Hand McNally and Co., 1964;, pp. 543-544.
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nations maneuver politically between the two large blocs 
to achieve a marginal and vicarious power which supple­
ments their vote and thereby decreases their political 
inferiority. Speaking of this political maneuvering, 
Benjamin Akzin said:
...most of the new States have adjusted themselves 
very well to the bloc pattern and have thereby mini­
mized the threat of an unequal position to which their 
newness, military weakness and economic and cultural 
backwardness seemed to destine them... At times the 
result is that not only has equality been restored 
in favor of the weaker States but that the weaker 
States gain a predominance of influence on arithmet­
ical grounds.27
Since the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of
November 5, 1950., by which the General Assembly under a
two-thirds majority assumed major responsibility and can
continue to do so "if the Security Council, because of
lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenacne
of international peace and security" the new nations are
is a position where they can influence the direction of
questions which normally are within the purview of the
28Security Council.
Hence, without the support of the new nations, the
General Assembly's efforts to create a United Nations
Emergency Force in Suez, its request for the Secretary-
General to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign troops
27'Akzin, op. cit., p. 156.
poFriedmann, op. cit., p. 53*
during tue Lebanese crisis in 1958, and its creation of a 
Conciliation Commission, composed of Asian and African 
representatives, for the pacification of internal dis­
sensions during the 1950 Congo crisis could have failed.
It is no mystery, therefore, that the new states "sponsor 
the wider bodies such as the General Assembly in which 
they enjoy formal equality."2^
Though peripheral to the main objective of this 
section, the reaction by some of the larger powers to the 
one nation-one vote system of the Assembly so effectively 
utilized by the numerically preponderant new nations should 
be mentioned. Publicists from several Western nations, 
particularly Great Britain and the United States, have 
suggested systems of weighted voting which distribute 
votes on the basis of prescribed criteria.-'0 Their con­
tention is that the voting system "should be proportioned 
to real power and influence in the world, defined by some 
formula which would give weight, but not exclusive weight,
29Akzin, op. cit., p. 154.
 ^Examples of various systems of weighted voting 
can be found in the following: Grenville Clark and Louis 
B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (3rd ed, rev.; 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 55-58; 
Korowicz, op. cit., pp. 265-266; Quincy Wright, Inter­
national Law and the United Nations (London: Asia Pub- 
lishing House, I960), p. 126.
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to the population factor."29 Yet, as Dag Hammarskjold said:
It is sometimes said that the system of one vote 
for one nation...and the consequent preponderance 
of votes by the middle and smaller powers, damages 
the usefulness 01 the Unites Nations... It is certainly 
not a perfect system, but is there any -proposal for 7.-1 
weighted voting that would not have even greater defects?
According to Wilfred Jenks, the General Assembly, as 
opposed to the financial specialized agencies of the United 
Nations system, the international commodity councils, the 
European Communities, and the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, has a wide range of responsibilities 
and where this exists:
...the factors to be taken into account in assessing 
the relative interest of its Members either in its 
work as a whole or in particular decisions are likely 
to be too varied and imponderable and the relative 
weight to be attehed to the different factors is 
likely to be the subject of acute controversy.32
Any decision affecting the voting procedure of the
General Assembly would necessitate both the concurrence
of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and
the agreement of all the permanent members of the Security 
33Council.  ^ While the small states would block any such 
action because of the fear that it would "destroy the 
belief in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small on which the United Nations Charter 
depends," it would be difficult for the five permanent
51Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, I960), p. 10.
32Jenks, or), cit., p. 53.
^United Nations, Charter., Art. 108.
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members of the Securitjr Council to consent unanimously 
to such an amendment because of the hesitancy of either 
the Western nations or the Soviet Union to alienate the 
future support of the new nations, and because of the 
probable lack of common agreement as to how differential
34voting weights should be allocated.''
Security Council
The Security Council with its permanent membership 
prescribed explicitly by the Charter in Article 23, para­
graph 1, and its non-permanent membership elected from 
the General Assembly "represents a striking example of
a departure from literal adherance to 'sovereign equal-
35ity'... Nevertheless the new nations realize that re­
gardless of the privileged position of the five permanent 
members of the Council, they can serve as a pressure group 
to open the non-permanent membership to wider representation, 
The Charter established two broad considerations 
for the General Assembly's election of the non-permanent 
members. First is the "contribution...to the maintenance 
of international peace and security and to the other
? John Karefa-Smart, "Africa and the United Nations," 
The United Nations in the Balance, eds. Norman J. Padelford 
and Leland M. Goodrich (New York: Frederich A. Praeger, 
1965), p. 409; Claude, ojd. cit., pp. 126-127.
^D. w. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions 
(New York: Frederich A. Praeger, 1963), p. 523".'’"
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purposes of the Organization" and the second is "equitable
56,geographical distribution."'' As early as 194-6, there 
were attempts to erect the second consideration into a 
rule binding on members in determining for whom their 
votes were to be cast. It is alleged that an unwritten, 
informal "gentleman's agreement" originated in London 
where the permanent members of the Security Council 
tacitly accepted the division of the world into five 
regions and supported a regional representation of the 
non-permanent seats of the Council according to the fol­
lowing pattern:, one seat for the British Commonwealth,
the Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and two
37seats for Latin America. Those states which were not 
parties to the 1946 agreement did not consider themselves 
bound by it.,. This was evident in the second session of 
the General Assembly in 1947 when the Indian representa­
tive said:
We have been told that the allocation of seats in the 
Security Council is based on some arrangement privately 
arrived at among some of the Powers. But the distrib­
ution of Council seats by secret diplomacy to which 
tne members of the General Assembly are not & party 
cannot, I am sure, find any support in this august body. 
Without in any way desiring to offend any of the 
Powers concerned, the delegation of India must 
challenge this arrangement. Our withdrawal should
36United Nations, Charter, Article 23, paragraph 1.
7,7'''Donald- C. Blaisdell, International Organization 
(New York: Ronald Press, 1966), p. 52. Also see: United 
Nations, Repertory of United Nations Practice. Vol. II,
New York, 1955, p. 8.
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not be taken to mean, nor does it imply, that we 
accept the so-called agreement between certain Powers 
for the distribution of seats.56
Yet, the Afro-Asian states were not in a numerically 
predominant position in 1946 and were unable, consequently, 
to acquire any change in the geographical distribution.
For the next sixteen years, the distribution of the non- 
permanent members accentuated the underrepresentation 
of the Afro-Asian nations as is shown by the accompanying 
table
1946: Number 1962: Number 
Seats of States of States
Latin America 2 20 22
Western Europe 1 c; 12
Commonwealth 1 4 4
Eastern Europe 1 7 13
Middle East 
(Asia, Africa)
1 10 56
In 196$, however, over thirty-two new states from 
Africa and Asia submitted a resolution to the eighteenth 
session of the General Assembly. The first section of 
the resolution (1991-XVIII-A) dealt with the Security 
Council. Recognizing that the "present composition of 
the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced" and
^Bailey,' op. cit., p. 167.
^Alf Ross, The United Nations: Peace and Progress 
(Totowa, New Jersey: The Sedminster Press, 1966), p. 120.
and that "the increase in the membership of the United 
Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of 
the Security Council," the Afro-Asian states submitted a 
Charter amendment which would increase the non—permanent 
membership from six to ten and a proposal which would 
distribute the non-permanent membership according to the 
following pattern:
(a) Five from the African and Asain States;
(b) One from Eastern European States;
(c) Two from Latin American States;
(d) Two from Western Europe and other States.^0 
The resolution passed by a vote of 97-11-4. It is
interesting to note that among the fifteen nations which 
either voted against the measure or abstained were France, 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, four of the five permanent members of the Council. 
Nevertheless, fifty-six Afro-Asian states plus twenty 
Latin American states formed the necessary two-thirds 
majority which was buttressed by a few nations from 
Western and Eastern Europe. Even the four permanent mem­
bers changed their position later for on August $1, 1965,
znthe amendment was ratified. Thus, in light of the 
4-0United Nations, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Eighteenth Session. Annexes, op. cit., p. 12.
41ttUnited Nations, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Plenary Meetings, ojd. cit.., p. 17.'
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recent increase in the Council's membership from eleven 
to fifteen, the Afro-Asian states now have five representa 
tives, or one-half of the non-permanent membership.
While secondary to the primary objective of this 
section, the veto is mentioned only as an obvious in­
equality which generates different attitudes among differ­
ent new states. In Benjamin Akzin's report, compiled 
by rapporteurs who collected data from their respective 
countries (India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Israel, the 
Phillippines, and Indonesia) on tne attitudes concerning 
involvement in international organization and prepared 
for UNESCO, he noted that while there was a general 
feeling of disenchantment with decision-making by unan­
imity, there was a divergence of opinion concerning the 
veto in the Security Council. India's representative 
stated:
...while unanimous decisions on important political 
questions are certainly desirable, it has to be admit­
ted that it is not in the realm of practical politics, 
decision by majority is the only feasible alternative 
unless the agreed rules of procedure provide otherwise 
This view also explains India's acquiescence in the 
retention of the right of veto assigned to the Big 
Pive Powers in the Security Council.^2
Contrary to India's position, however, the Lebanese 
representative believed that his country preferred the
4?Akzin, o£. cit., p. 177.
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majority principle as opposed to the veto because, for
one thing, "it is still not certain that the Great Powers
would not prefer to come to terms among themselves outside
of the U. N. rather than use the U. N. as the instrument
whereby a genuine, sovereign, international authority
could be created." He recognized that any extension
of the majority principle would necesitate a change in
the relationship between General Assembly and Security
Council, but "this change has already been initiated by
the resolution 'Uniting for Peace,' and only needs to be
43carried to its logical conclusion." The Pakistani 
investigator simply said, "The rule of Big Power unan­
imity in the Security Council has frustrated the working
44of that organ of the United Nations..."
In summary, regardless of the veto, which the new 
nations recognize will be present as long as the large 
powers are present, the new states take whatever measures 
they can as means to dispel the gap between themselves 
and the great powers. One realistic measure which already 
has proved successful was the expansion of the non­
permanent membership of the Security Council.
The Economic and Social Council
Before August 31, 1965, the Economic and Social
^Akzin, on. cit., p. 188.
44Akzin, 0£. cit., p. 191.
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Council consisted of eighteen members elected for three 
year terms by a two-thirds majority vote of the General 
Assembly. Generally, the distribution of seats was as 
follows:
(a) Four from Latin America;
(b) Four from Asia and Africa;
(c) Three from Eastern Europe;
(d) Five from Western, Northern and Southern Europe
(e) One from the older Commonwealth States;
(f) One from the United States.
After the heavy influx of new nations in 1955, 
ECOSOC, like the General- Assembly and the Security Council 
became subject to the new nations' demands fora larger 
membership and a more equitable geographical distribution. 
They cared little for the provision in Article 69 of the 
Charter which allowed ECOSOC !,to invite any Member of the 
United Nations to participate, without vote, in its 
deliberations on any matter of particular concern to 
that Member." Their interest was for greater opportunity 
to exercise the vote since decision-making in ECOSOC is
governed by simple majority and where each member has one
, 46 vote.
The first resolution in support of an increase in
^Bailey,' on. cit., pp. 175-176.
^ Everyman's United Nations (7th ed.; New York: 
United Nations Office of Public Information, 1964), p. 15. 
For the remaining part of this chapter, the Economic and
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the membership of the Council was adopted by the Council
in July, 195S» and by the Assembly during the thirteenth
and fourteenth sessions. The resolution failed to become
an amendment to the Charter, however, because of the
47Soviet Union's opposition.
On December 17, 1963, Resolution 1991 came before 
the eighteenth session of the General Assembly. The 
second section of the resolution, the first section was 
discussed earlier in reference to the Security Council, 
proposed the expansion of SCOSOC's membership from 
eighteen to twenty-seven with the additional membership 
distribution according to the following pattern:
(a) Seven from African and Asian States;
(b) One from Latin American States;
48(c) One from Western European and other States. 
Ethiopia's Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy's comment was significant
in that it indicated the role which the Afro-Asian nations 
played in the formulation of the resolution:
Social Council shall be designated as EC030C.
^Bailey, ojd. cit., p. 176. The Soviet Union, at 
least until the adoption of Resolution 1991-XVIII (the ex­
pansion of the Security Council and ECOSOC) in 1963 opposed 
any increase in the U. N. organ, not because of the merit 
of the proposals, but because it wasa protest for the ab­
sence of The People's Republic of China. (Bailey, on, cit., 
p. 176.)
4ftUnited -Nations, Official Records of ttie 3-eneral 
Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, op. cit., p. 13.
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I am bound to say that the preparation of the two 
draft resolutions now before the Assembly has taken a 
long time. I think it is no secret that the thirty- 
two African States have had a great deal to do with 
preparation of these...resolutions.49
The resolution was adopted by 97-11-4, with fifty- 
eight affirmative votes from the new Afro-Asian nations 
and twenty affirmative votes from Latin America. By 
August 31, 1965, the necessary two-thirds majority, in­
cluding all the permanent members of the Security Council, 
had approved the amendment with the result that by January,
1965, ECOSOC's membership stood at twenty-seven of which
50seven were from Afro-Agia.
The latest move registered by the Afro-Asian states'
in their consistent struggle for greater equality came on 
March 4, 1966, when, during the fortieth session of ECOSOC,
■
resolution 1099 (XL) concerning the enlargement of the
1^Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations was presented."' 
The resolution was formulated with the idea that since 
ECOSOO's membership had expanded, it was necessary to 
increase the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
^United Nations, Official Records of the General 
Assembly. Eighteenth Session. Plenary Meeting, op. cit., 
p. 16.
^United Nations, Annual Renort of the Secretary- 
General on the Work of the Organization, Twenty-first 
Session, Supplement No . (A/6301), vNew' York, 19-■;>),P • 154.
^The Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations 
advises ECOSOC on which non-governmental organizations are 
to be given consultative status. (Everyman's United Nations, 
on. cit., p., 17-)
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from seven to thirteen and to distribute the proposed 
membership on the following basis:
(a) Five members from Afro-Asian States;
(b) Four members from Western European and other 
States;
(c) Two members from Latin American States;
(d) Two members from Socialist States of Eastern 
Europe.
After little debate, the resolution was adopted by 
22-1-4.52
Specialized Agencies (Financial Agencies)
This section concentrates only on the financial 
agencies of the United Nations since they are governed by 
a system of weighted voting which placed the now under­
developed nations in an inferior voting position as com­
pared with the large industrialized nations. Even this 
discussion of the new nations and the financial agencies 
is broad, although it is narrowed and treated in a more 
detailed manner in the section on the Special United 
Nations Fund for Economic Development.
The first international organization created with
♦
the main purpose of "making available world-wide loans 
to Governments and, under governmental guarantee, to
52United Nations, Official Records of trie economic 
and Social Council, Fortieth Session, Supnlement No. 1 
(E/4-176), p. 7.
private persons such as to business, industrial and
agricultural enterprises in the territories of its member
States" was the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
55Development.'^ It was established during the Bretton
Woods Conference of 1944 to meet international financial
54problems that were envisaged for the postwar period.
Even at the Bretton Woods Conference, the underdeveloped
nations, represented by the Latin American countries, were
skeptical about the Bank since they "were afraid that the
Bank would allocate too large a share of its resources to
reconstruction and that not enough would be left for 
55development."  ^ Thus, they proposed that the Bank should 
allocate equal amounts for development and reconstruction, 
and although this proposal was defeated on the grounds 
that equal allotments for both areas would leave in­
sufficient funds for development loans after the recon­
struction was completed, the underdeveloped states at 
least succeeded in adding the word "development" to the 
name of the Bank and included in the Article of Argument
104
-'^ Uner Kirdar, The Structure of the United Nations 
Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries (The fla~ue: Martinus 
Kijhoff, 1966), pp. 105-104.
^Wolfgang G. Friedmann, George Kalmanoff, Robert F. 
Meagher, International Financial Aid (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1966), p. 90.
55'^ Kirdar, otd. cit., p. 105.
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the following provision:
The resources and the facilities of the Bank shall 
be used exclusively for the benefit of members with 
equitable consideration to projects for development 
and projects for reconstruction a l i k e . 56
Yet, the underdeveloped nations' greatest 
skepticism concerning the Bank, the International Mone­
tary Fund (IMF) also established at the Bretton Woods 
Conference for the purpose of financing temporary balanee- 
of-payments deficits, and the International Finance Corp­
oration (IFC) created in July, 1956, as an affiliate 
of the World Bank to "further economic development by 
encouraging the growth of productive private enterprise 
in member countries, particularly in the less developed 
areas," is their system of weighted voting."'^ The Bank 
and the IMF operate on the same voting scale: each member 
of the governing board, designated as the Board of Gov­
ernors both in the Bank and the IMF, has 250 votes plus 
on additional vote for each additional share of stock 
equivalent to $l,000.^c
The new nations, while members of each, feel that 
the system of weighted voting is weighted in favor of the 
Western industrial nations. This contention is verified
56
Kirdar, on. cit., p. 103.
57
Kirdar, on. cit., p. 144; also, for the text of 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Finance 
Corporation, see: United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 264,
"^Kirdar, 0£. cit., pp. 107, 144, and 180.
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by the following table :
World Bank Subscriptions and Voting Shares of Six
Largest Contributors 
(Percent)
Share of Total Share of Total
Capital Subscribed Votes
United States 28.07 25.25
United Kingdom 11.4-9 10.4-0
West Germany 5.66 5.17
Prance 4.64 4.26
India 3.54 3.27
Canada 3.50 3.23
Total 56.90 52.58
59
Their argument is further substantiated by the 
fact that five of the eighteen Executive Directors re­
sponsible for the conduct of the general operations of 
the Bank and the exercise of all the powers delegated
to them by the Board of Governors, are appointed by
60the five largest stockholders.
The IMP, with the largest voting power belonging 
to the United States (51,850 votes, 23.82$ of the total 
voting power) and the second, third, and fourth largest 
voting pov/ers belonging to the United Kingdom, Prance, 
and Germany, respectively, and the IPC, with the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Prance, also indicates
5Q
' 'International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Statement of Subscription to Capital Stock 
and Voting Power, Bank Press R e l e a s e No. 57/21 (March 31, 
1967), Appendix■C , p. 7. In 1967, the Bank had a total 
of 105 members. (Ibid.)
^Kirdar, o p .  cit., p .  1 0 9 .
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the predominant voting power of the Western nations.61 
As Benjamin Akzin said:
...the position of members of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the 
International Monetary Fund resembles that of stock­
holders in a joint stock company more than that of 
members in an ordinary intergovernmental organization.?!
Though not related directly to the voting system, 
the economic practices of the IMF are viewed as "hardfisted" 
and "orthodox" by many of the new nations. The IMF, as 
a pool of money contributed according to agreed quotas 
by each member with 25 percent of the quota paid in gold 
and the remainder in the country's own currency, "binds 
its members not to alter the exchange rates more than 
10 percent from the iftitial par value without the Fund's 
permission." Permission requires a majority vote, but 
these votes, as already indicated, are wighted so that 
in fact, permission "means the consent of countries that 
have the major financial stake in the Fund."b^ Q}he 
Bank's system of "hard loans," a high interest rate (6 %)
61
International Monetary Fund, Executive Directors 
and Voting; Power, Annual Report. 1966, Appendix 1, p. 155.
* Total membership of the IMF in 1966 was 103. (Ibid., p. 53.) 
International Finance Corporation, Statement of Subscriptions 
to Capital Stock and Voting Power, Annual Report. 1965-1966. 
Appendix E, p. W T .  In 1966, the IFC's total membership 
was 81. (Ibid.)
62
Akzin, on. cit., p. 148.
63
Philip E. Jacob and Alexine L. Atherton, The 
Dynamics of International Organization (Homewood, Illinois: 
The Dorsey Press, 1966), pp. 380 and 456.
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with a maximum term of twenty-five years, is also
disliked by many of the new states. The new nations have
done nothing to chaage the weighted voting within the
agencies, although they were instrumental in creating
what they considered a more equitable structure for
development financing, the International Development
Association (IDA). While retaining weighted voting,
500 votes per member plus one additional vote for each
$5*000 of its subscription, the IDA was a reaction
65
to the World Bank's "hard loans." The IDA charges no 
interest rates, only a service charge to defray admin­
istrative expenses, and uniformly grants a repayment
period of fifty years, including an initial grace period 
66
of ten years.''""'
The voting system weighted heavily for the Western 
countries remains as an example of inequality to the new 
nations. Yet, these agencies have contributed much of 
their reserves to these developing nations. Thus, rather
64-Ray Blough, "The Furtherance of Economic Development;" 
The United Nations in the Balance, eds. Norman J. Padelford 
and Leiand K. Goodrich (New.York: Frederich A. Praeger,
1965), p. 208.
^Kirdar, o£. cit., p, 262.
66
Friedmann, Kalmanoff, and Meagher, o p . cit. 
pp. 104-105.
than invoke the doctrine of state equality at the expense 
of alienating their benfactors, the new nations, as Inis 
Claude has indicated, "subordinate their urge for formal 
equality to the desire for international aid. They 
had learned earlier in their experience with the attempt 
to establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development (SUNFED) that a dogmatic appeal to the 
doctrine could stifle the realization of their objectives.
Special United Nations Fund 
For Economic Development
What the new nations desire is an agency which 
combines low interest loans and a system governed, by 
equal voting. Despite the modest success of the Point 
Four Program established by the United States in 194-9 
as a "bold new program" of technical assistance to 
developing areas and the Expanded Program of Technical 
Assistance established by the United Nations in 194-9 
to provide these areas with "experts, fellowships, 
supplies, and equipment," the developing areas insistently 
pushed for a larger United Nations' undertaking,- backed 
by the United States and other advanced countries, to
ro
finance their economic development.00 The European
°^Claude,.on. cit., p. 127.
Robert E. Elder and Forrest D. Murden, Economic 
Cooperation: Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development'(Woodrow Wilson Foundation: Seminars on the 
United Nations, No. 2; New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation,
Cooperation Administration and the Marshall Plan, both 
created by the United States, lent credence to their 
j argument that, on the one hand, the United States could 
I do more to aid the less developed countries and that, 
i on the other hand, these programs were examples of 
"economic discrimination" against them. The technical 
\ assistance programs, they believed, could yield only 
I limited results unless backed by substantial investment.
Thus, from a desire to obtain greater international and 
i even more bilateral and multilateral support for their 
I economic development, and from a disgust with the "hard 
; loan" policy of the World Bank which was made more 
oppressive by the Bank's system of weighted voting, the 
; developing nations pressed for the creation of 3UNFED, an 
agency which would make grants and "soft loans" (long-term 
I and low-interest) on a large scale and which would be 
controlled by an organizational structure where each 
, nation has only one vote.0*'
As early as 194-9, the developing nations began 
; the movement in ECOSOC and the General Assembly for the 
; establishment of a U. N. capital development fund to be
| used, for financing economic development.^0 The most
I
1954), p. 4.; I.M.D. Little and J.M*. Clifford, 
Internationa! Aid (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966),
P • 2 5 •
69
'Blough, o p .  cit., p. 207; Elder, pp. cit., p .  5. 
Little, o p . cit. , p. 4-7.
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Blough, op. cit., p. 207. For details of the
concerted efforts, however, were made at the fifth 
session of the General Assembly in 1950 where a unani­
mously adopted resolution called on ECO.SQC to study 
plans for "an increased flow of international public funds" 
to the developing areas and to submit recommendations to 
the sixth session of the Aseembly.^
The thirteenth session of EC0.30C (1951) was the 
scene of the first obvious cleavage between the developed 
and the developing nations, while the developing nations 
argued for a development fund which would channel econ­
omic aid from the advanced nations through an inter­
national agency, the developed nations endeavored to:
...focus attention on measures to increase the 
international flow of private rather than public 
capital, and of expanding the lending operations 
of the public institutions already in existence - 
the United States Export-Import Bank and the Inter­
national .Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Since the Council at the time was divided almost equally
between the developed and developing nations, the reso-
j lution sponsored by Chile, Pakistan, and the Philippines, and
India to establish a new development fund was defeated (10
first proposals, particularly those of India's 
R. K. V. Rao, see: Elder, op. cit., p. 6 ; John G. Eadwen 
and Johan Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions Are Made 
(Leyden, Netherlands: A. v/. Sythoff, 1961),~ pp. 85-86.
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Ill
^Elder, on. cit., p. 5.
votes to 1, with 7 abstentions). The resolution was 
finally adopted by a vote of 14-0-4 and dealt at length 
with various aspects of financial economic development 
and stated that ECOSOC neither accepted nor rejected the 
principle of the establishment of a special international 
fund.n
The discussion of a development fund at the sixth 
j session of the General Assembly was similar to the one 
during the thirteenth ECOSOC session. Again, a number 
of developing nations sponsored a resolution which urged 
> the creation of a special fund designated then as the 
; International Development Authority and again the devel- 
oped nations opposed the plan. Fart A of the resolution 
I finally adopted by 30-16-11, with most of the developed
I nations voting negatively, concerned grant assistancei
and requested ECOSOC "to submit to the General Assembly 
at its seventi regular session a detailed plan for 
establishing, as soon as circumstances permit, a special 
fund for grants-in-aid and low-interest, long-term 
loans to underdeveloped countries..."^
In response to the resolution on the sixth General 
Assembly session, ECOSOC established the Committee of 
Nine composed of four developed nations, Belgium, Denmark, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, and five 
developing countries, Pakistan, the Philippines, Chile,
73
| 112
'^Hadwen and Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 88.
7£l
Hadwen and Kaufmann, o p .  cit., p .  89.
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Yugoslavia, and Mexico. The seventh General Assembly 
session requested the Committee to present a "detailed 
plan" the following session bearing in mind that "...it 
is necessary to immediately give special attention to the 
problem of international financing of economic and social
75
development..." The Committee began its work on 
January 21, 1953, and met for seven continuous weeks 
until its unanimous report was submitted in March. It 
proposed the creation of a Special United Nations Fund 
for Economic Development and its initials of the title, 
SUNFED, became widely used from this date onwards to 
describe the idea of a large-scale U. N. capital aid 
fund.^  The plan submitted was detailed as requested; 
however, this chapter deals only with the proposed 
structure and administration of SUNFED. The Committee 
recommended that in order "to provide immediate govern­
ment control," a General Council of the Fund would meet 
annually. The General Council, in time, would "elect 
eight to twelve governments to constitute an Executive 
Board." As far as the Board's composition was concerned, 
the Committee recommended the following:
There should be equal representation on the 
Executive Board of the major contributors to the 
Fund, on the one hand, and of the other members,
^Elder, .op. cit., p. 9.
^ Hadwen and Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 90.
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regard being bad to the need for a reasonable 
distribution among these latter members of the 
Board.< <
The Executive Board would appoint a Director- 
General after consulting with the Secretary-General of 
the United Rations. While speaking of the responsibility 
of the Director-General to cast a vote in "the event of 
a tie, the Committee also stressed that:
No mechanism of weighted voting should operate 
in the Executive Board. We feel that every effort 
should be made to ach£ve unanimous agreement; 
however, if division should occur, decisions should 
be taken by a simple majority vote. No Director 
shall participate in, or be present during a vote 
on an application by his own government.7o
The sixteenth session of ECOSOC received the
report, but the United States diverted the attention
from the report by making a proposal to use a substantial
percentage of the savings derived from internationally
supervised disarmament in a fund designed for financial
assistance to developing countries. The Council, as a
result, limited itslef to simply forwarding the report to
the eighth session of the General Assembly without adding 
79any comments.
The eighth General Assembly propos ed two plans:
(l) to ask member governments to appraise the report of
77
United Nations, Report on the Special United Nations 
Fund for Economic Development, Submitted by a Committee 
appointed by the Secretary-General, (E/2381, March 18,
1953) (New York, 1953), p. 35.
78roid., pp. 35-36.
79''Hadwen and Kaufmann, op., cit., p. 90.
the Committee of Nine and to ask Hr. Raymond Scheyven of 
Belgium to examine the comments, to consult with the 
governments, and to report the results to EC080C and the 
General Assembly, (2) to investigate the possibilities of
establishing an economic development fund derived from
80
the savings resulting from disarmament.
During the deliberation of the General Assembly,
opposition to the proposed international fund was adamant,
particularly among most of the American business community
and national business organizations such as the Chamber of
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.
In Nation's Business was an article entitled "SUNFED -
Your Name on a Blank Check" with a sub-title: "Taxpayers
are on the spot again as the new international aid scheme
SI
: raises false hopes aaong the foreign nations." The
substance of the article concentrated on the equal voting
power of the contributors and the recipients which, it
asserted, would mean that "the borrowers v/ould run the
bank." As Robert Elder indicated:
The political significance of the-problem to the 
United States, however, was recognized by the author, 
for he pointed out that, in view of the numerical 
majority of the underdeveloped countries, "passage 
of SUNFED could have serious political consequences 
for the United States throughout the world as angry
115
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81Henry La Gossett, "SUNFED - Your Name on a Blank 
Check," Nation's Business, October, 1953, as quoted in 
Elder, o p . cit., p. 14.
criticism of our attitude increases in the bloc of 
malcontent countries.
Raymond Scheyven's report confirmed the attutuae 
which had been expressed in the Committee of Nine. He 
noted that the debate in ECOSOC and the General Assembly 
brought out a moral imperative for the "wealthier coun- 
tries to come to the help of the 'poorer countries." He 
also spoke of the Bank's role in the financing of invest­
ment by quoting the Bank's President who, when speaking 
before the General Assembly on December 10, 1951, admitted 
the Bank's limitations in the financing of the development 
of the underdeveloped areas and stated that "any additional
assistance to those countries should be in the form of
84
grants rather than quasi-loans..." Summarizing the 
attitude of the industrialized nations toward the creation 
of a development fund, Scheyven said they believed:
...that contributing countries should be able to 
pass on questions of principle, and to express their 
views on the distribution of reserves, with a weight 
corresponding to the size of their contribution; that 
if they are not given some guarantee of this kind, 
contributing countries may well rapidly lose interest 
in the Pund.^5
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-'United Nations, Special United Nations Fund for 
Economic Development, Final Report by Mr. Raymond Scheyven, 
prepared in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 724 B 
(VIII), General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, 
Supplement No. 19 (A/2728) (New York, 1954), p. 4.
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After receiving the Scheyven Heport, ECOSOC adopted 
a resolution which recommended that the next General 
Assembly session urge governments to review their posi­
tions with respect to establishing a special fund and 
that it extend Mr. Scheyven's appointment/'0
The ninth General Assembly accepted ECOSOC's 
recommendation and asked Sc'heyven to prepare an additional 
report to be prepared by an ad hoc committee of experts 
representing their respective nations, Chile, Egypt,
France, India, the Netherlands, the United States, and 
P>r?
Yugoslavia. The Committee of Experts' report was pre­
sented before the twentieth session of ECOSOC and the 
tenth session of the General Assembly in 1955. Basically, 
it followed the same reasoning as the report issued by 
the Committee of Nine. It asserted the principle of 
equal representation of contributors and recipients on 
the Executive Board. The report stated "that this recom­
mendation should be. adopted, despite the comment on this
question by a number of developed countries which would
ftp
assure them a preponderant influence.""^’
The tenth session of the General Assembly was 
convened in a "general atmosphere of optimism." The
S6
Hadwen and Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 93.
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'United Nations, Special United Nations Fund for 
Economic Development, Official Records, Tenth Session, 
Supplement No. 17 (A/2906), (New York, 1955), p. v.
88Tv. .Ioid. , p. 1;?.
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developing nations believed that the drafting of a statute 
j for a large U. . special fund should no longer be delayed, 
but the optimistic spirit of the new nations was stymied 
by the resistence of the developed nations. The com­
promise resulted in the creation of another ad hoc committee 
composed this time of government representatives who 
were to analyze the comments which governments were to 
give in reply to a specific questionaire. Prom May 7 
to June 6 , 1956, and from March 11-12, 1957, the Ad Hoc 
Committee prepared its report which, after completion, 
contained forty-six written statements, later increased 
to fifty-seven. Of special importance to this study, 
however, was the attitude of about fifty nations in regard 
to the structure of the fund. The report stated that 
most governments "which deal with general principles
I stress three, namely: the principle of universality and 
equality of member nations, avoidance of a new bureau­
cracy, and flexibility of administration."0^
The cycle of frustration was again repeated at 
ECOSOC's twenty-second session where the usual pressure 
for the drafting of statutes was deferred by the reaction-
■
ary pressure of the developed nations. The inevitable 
compromise was a resolution that urged governments which
89^
United Nations, Final Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Questionof the Establishment of a Spec­
ial United Nations Fund for Economic Development, Official 
Records. Twelfth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 28 lA/3579 
and Add. I), (New York, 1957T, p. 25.
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had not submitted their written views to the Ad Hoc
90
Committee to do so as soon as possible.'
The eleventh session of the General Assembly in
1956 did little except repeat the cycle of the request
for statutes from the developing nations, the opposition
from the developed nations, and a compromise resolution
which requested the Ad Hoc Committee to indicate "the
different forms of legal framework on which a Special
United Nations Fund for Economic Development may be
ci
established and Statutes drafted."'
After six years, SUNFED was still a plan 
championed by the new nations and opposed by the developed 
nations- As time passed, the proponents and the opposi­
tion of the Fund became more rigid until a stalemate was 
reached in the twenty-fourth session of SCOSOC, in 1957- 
After hearing the final and supplementary report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee which had presented alternate systems 
in the creation of a special fund, the SUNFED supporters 
pressed for the adoption of a resolution urging the 
General Assembly to take steps leading to the immediate 
establishment of the fund. The resolution was adopted 
15-3-0 , the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
qp
Canada dissenting. The result, However, was far from
^Hadwen-and Kaufmann, op,. cit., p. 93.
^ H a d w e n  and Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 93* 
qp
y Hadwen and Kaufmann, on. cit., p. 95*
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favorable. As John Hadwen said:
Neither the "victors" nor the "losers" were happy 
about the result. An open decision had emerged on 
this subject, a situation that had been averted since 
the split vote at the 6th General Assembly session in 
1951. A reconsideration of the issue was therefore 
required if similar decisions at the 12th General 
Assembly session were to be a v o i d e d .93
The basis for a reconsideration came remarkably 
soon, namely the twelfth session of the General Assembly 
(1957). Shortly before the session, the United States 
was known to favor the creation of a small U. N. fund, 
called a "Special Projects Fund," which could sponsor 
projects that could not be financed by the Expanded 
Program of Technical Assistance. On November 18, 1957, 
the United States presented its proposed fund in the 
form of a resolution. It was tabled for later discussion. 
Ironically, about this same time, eleven proponents of 
SUNFED proposed a plan which differed somewhat from the 
traditional approach. The primary difference concerned 
the voting procedure within the Executive Board. Hather 
than a single majority vote which had been advocated 
earlier by the Committee of Nine, the eleven nation 
resolution proposed a qualified majority, vote, either 
two-thirds or three-quarters:. This new voting arrangement 
was designed to prevent major contributing countries from 
being outvoted by the recipient nations. Even the name 
of their proposed fund was changed from SUNFED to EDF
95'^Hadwen and Kaufmann, or>. cit.., p. 95*
(Economic Development Fund). Yet, few of the EDF 
supporters were "prepared to insist on their proposal 
to the extent of refusing that sponsored by the United 
States, which promised at least some increase in the 
total volume of U. N.. economic aid." Thus, a compromise 
resolution, introduced by the eleven nations plus the 
United States, Canada, and France was adopted. It was 
to establish a Special Fund as an expansion of the 
U. N.'s technical assistance programs and the projects 
sponsored by the specialized agencies by creating a 
Preparatory Committee of sixteen countries, composed of 
six Western nations, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
three Latin American nations, and five Afro-Asian nations, 
to draft rules governing the fund. The resolution was 
adopted with the result that during the twenty-sixth 
session of ECOSOC and the thirteenth session of the 
General Assembly, the Preparatory Committee presented 
its suggestions including the following: (l) equal repre­
sentation on the Governing Council of economically more 
developed nations and less developed nations; (2) a two- 
thirds majority rule for the decisions of the Governing 
Council on important questions. The suggestions were accep 
ed unanimously. The Council and the Assembly later adopted
■
a resolution embodying these suggestions, thereby estab­
lishing the Special Fund which was to begin functioning
on January 1 , 1 959.94-
In summary, "the new nations failed to achieve their 
original aspirations for SUNFED primarily because of their 
insistence on sovereign equality within the proposed 
structure of the fund. Yet, not desiring to lose econ­
omic assistance from the major contributing nations, the 
new nations compromised their original position in order 
to remain on the receiving end of the Western aid. Thus, 
j the failure of SUNFED proved Inis Claude's assertion noted 
! earlier in the chapter:
...the Western powers - particularly the United 
States - have a persuasive instrument in their cap­
acity to grant or to withhold the financial resources 
required for support of United Nations programs of 
assistance to developing states. The record shows 
that in several instances the urge for formal equality 
has been subordinated to the desire for international' 
aid.95
The United Nations Conference 
On Trade and Development
122
Another aspiration of the new nations is to 
✓
overcome what Raul Prebisch, the Secretary-General of the 
j United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
has termed the "trade gap," or the economic inverse pro­
portion in which the prices of Western manufactured goods
94
Hadv/en and Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 95.9 9 ; 131- 
132. Proposals for a U.N. capital development fund,' 
similar to SUNFED, are still made. For a'general dis­
cussion of those efforts, see: Blaisdell, o p . cit., p .  15 9.
95
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| needed by the developing nations increase while the
jfinancial returns of the developing nations' exportation
Q6
j of primary goods decrease.' Only by overcoming this
"
"trade gap" can the new nations ever hope to gain a 
semblance of economic equality with the West. Yet, since 
the new nations believe that existing trade agreements 
are influenced largely by Western nations and make only 
token contributions to areas of underdevelopment, they 
urge the creation of institutions which are not only 
sensitive to the needs of the developing nations, but 
which are governed by equal voting.
because the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) exemplified, according to the developing nations, 
a trend in the "existing principles and patterns of world 
trade" which favour the advanced parts of the world," 
and because GATT's Program of Action designed to reduce
j or eliminate trade restrictions on products from the
developing nations failed to achieve its objectives, the-
developing nations pressed for the convening of a United
97
Nations conference on trade.' This action, however, was
^ S e e  Raul Prebisch, "Conference on Trade and 
Development Concludes at Geneva," United Nations Monthly 
Chronicle, I (July, 1964), p. 50. ?or an analyzation of 
the "trade gap," see: Richard N. Gardner, "GATT and the 
UNCTAD," International Organization, Vol. XVIII (Autumn, 
1964), pp. 696-698.
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"United Nations, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 5 (A/5514), 
(New York, 1955), P* 24; Blough, op. cit., p. 211.
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the culmination of a long series of similar efforts, 
although the examination of these earlier efforts is not 
within the purview of this chapter.^8
Following the thirty-fourth session of ECOSOC in 
1962 which, after "bearing in mind the vital importance 
of the rapid growth of exports and export earnings of 
developing countries, of primary products and manufacture, 
for promoting their economic development," resolved to 
convene a United Nations Conference for Economic Develop­
ment and establish a preparatory committee of experts to 
consider agenda topics, the seventeenth General Assembly 
sesoion recommended that the Conference convene as soon 
as possible. The next session of ECOSOC enlarged the
124
Harry G. Johnson noted that while GATT's multi­
lateral bargaining gives "the smaller nations more 
effective participation in the negotiation of tariff 
reductions, the reciprocity principle in particular en­
sures that the bargaining will be dominated by the larger 
developed countries. Harry G. Johnson, Economic Policies 
iiPwarC- Less Developed Countries (Washington, D . C ..:" The 
-•rookings Institute, 19b7), p. 16. Speaking on behalf 
of the developing nations folia;ing the ratifications of 
ohe Kennedy Round tariff-cutting agreements in June 19&7 
Peruvian Ambassador Jose Antonio Esninas said: "The* 
developing countries deeply regret that they are not 
in a^position to share, to the same extent, the satis­
faction of the developed countries at the conclusion 
and the achievements of the Kennedy Round." (The Denver 
Post, June 30, 1967, p. 1.) ------ -— ~
98-ct
i?or a good rendition of the earlier attempts to 
establish conferences on trade, see: Blough, o p . cit. 
pp._209-212; United Nations, Proceedings of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Pinel 4ct 
(e/CCNF. 4-6/141, vol. 1, 23 March - 16 June,
1964;, (Geneva, 1964), p . 101.
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Preparatory Committee to thirty and again, on a 
recommendation of the Committee itself, during its thirty- 
fifth session in April, 1963, to thirty-three countries. 
The Committee's enlarged membership included thirteen 
Afro-Asian states, four Eastern European states, six Latin 
American states, and nine Western states. During the 
second of the three meetings of the Committee, a joint
statement was submitted by seventy-six developing nations
90
indicating strong support for the proposed UNCTAD."'' It 
stated that "what the world lacks today is, therefore, 
not the awareness of the problem (the 'trade gap'), but 
the readiness to act."'''00
During the thirty-sixth session of EC030C, the 
Council noted the wide interest expressed in the pro­
posed conference and, therefore, decided that the Confer­
ence should-be held in Geneva from March 23 to June 15, 
1964-. The Council also approved the provisional agenda 
outlined by the Preparatory Committee. The importance 
of the joint statement submitted by the seventy-six 
developing nations was acknowledged during the eighteenth 
General Assembly session and, after receiving the reports 
of the Preparatory Committee and of ECOSOC, annexed the
^ U n i t e d  Nations, Proceedings of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, op. cit., p. 102.
■*"00United Nations, Official Records, Eighteenth 
Session, Supplement No. 5, ££. cit., p. 24.
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the Joint Declaration to a resolution which stated that 
"the purposes of the forthcoming United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development are gaining strong support."101
On March 2$, 1964, UNCTAD convened in Geneva. It 
was the largest trade conference ever held, assembling
102
over 2,000 delgates from 120 countries and the Vatican.
The Cameroon's Ahidjo expressed well the sentiment of the
new nations meeting in Geneva when he said:
We firmly believe it was time that the two worlds, on 
one hand, countries with an embarrassing surplus of 
foodstuffs and capital for which unable to find appro­
priate use at home, and on the other, countries suffer­
ing hunger, poverty, ignorance; in short, under­
development should hold reasoned discussion.-'-0^
The work of the Conference was organized into five 
committees designed to cover five areas, only one of which, 
institutional arrangements, is considered in this section. 
The committee system proved unweildly, however, and the 
bulk of the work had to be done by special working par­
ties and conciliation groups because of the insistence
of the seventy-seven developing countries, which possessed
104
a clear majority, detrmined to present a united front.
101United Nations, Proceedings of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, on. cit., p. 103.
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10^United Nations, Proceedings of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, op. cit., p. 36.
1°/*’These other areas included international commod­
ity problems, trade in semimanufactured and manufactured 
goods, the financing of development, and expansion of
In fact, according to a joint declaration issued by the 
developing nations toward the end of the Conference, the 
developing nations regarded their own unity "as the out­
standing feature of the Conference."105 Nevertheless, 
the economically advanced countries observed this unity 
as a threat to their position since the one nation-one 
vote system of the Conference placed them in a very 
distinct minority. The cleavage was obvious and the only 
way to prevent aborting the Conference was through a 
different process of decision—making. Under the leadership 
of Raul Prebisch, the focus of the Conference turned to 
"working out through conciliation...forms of wording that 
were limited to stating the issues and the possible lines 
of action in a way that some or most of the developed
countries from which concessions were demanded could 
106
accept." After all, as the delegate from the Philippines 
said:
It is an obvious fact that on the basis of single 
majority the developing nations can out-vote the 
developed nations at any time. Yet what will it avail... 
to reach decisions by simple majority if the defeated 
minority includes the yecy countries from whom con­
cessions are expected.1 0 ^
In some cases, the developing states disregarded the 
conciliatory processes and, by simple majority, passed
international trade and its significance for economic 
development. (Johnson, 0£. cit., pp. 33-3 4 .)
105
United Nations, Proceedings, op. cit., p. 67.
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proposals such as the first General Principle which stated 
that "economic relations between countries, including 
trade relations, shall be based on respect for the prin­
ciple of sovereign equality of States, self-determination 
of peoples, and non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other countries." General Principle One v/as adopted 
by 113-1-2, with the United States voting against the 
measure and Portugal and the United Kingdom abstaining. °
In the majority of the important issues, however, 
conciliation was the only means for achieving solutions. 
This was most evident in the debate on the form of in­
stitutional arrangements necessary for the "continuing 
machinery" of UNCTAD. Although it was decided to estab­
lish a fifty-five member Trade and Development Board 
composed of twenty-two Afro-Asian states, eighteen Western 
states, nine Latin American states, and six Eastern 
European states as a permanent organ of the Conference 
and as an affiliate of the "United Nations machinery in 
the economic field," the major contention centered on the 
operational and voting procedures within the Board. The 
developing nations wanted a one nation-one vote system 
which would be used in determining policy by a simple
■^^Gardner, on. cit., p. 703.
T OPt
It is- interesting to note that on some occasions, 
the developing nations were joined by the Communist bloc, 
while the developed nations split in that the Common Market 
countries, with the exception of West Germany, abstained as 
did Japan and the European Free Trade Association other 
than the United Kingdom, and the United States voted 
negatively. (Johnson, on. cit., p. 37.)
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majority. They spoke in a united voice when they said: 
"The developing nations attach cardinal importance to 
democratic procedures which afford no position of priv­
ilege in the economic and financial, no less than in the
109
political sphere." The developed nations, on the
other hand, denied procedural arrangements which would
capitalize on conciliatory processes so as to protect
their own economic interests.^0
A compromise was adopted. The job of working out
voting procedures was left to a special committee appoint
ed by the Secretary-General. This committee was asked to
prepare proposals for procedures, vithin the con­
tinuing machinery designed to establish a process of 
conciliation to take place before voting and to pro­
vide an adequate basis for the adoption of recommend­
ations with regard to proposals of a specific nature 
for action substantially affecting the economic or 
financial interests of particular countries.. . H I
This action echoed the activities of the SUNFED
cycle —  the desires of the new nations, the reaction of
the developed nations, and the resulting compromise. The
Special Committee established by UNCTAD was, as Philip
Jacob said, " a far cry from the glowing expectations of
nip
the have-nots when they entered the Conference.""*'
109United Nations, Proceedings, op. cit.. p. 67. 
^■^Gardner, 0£. cit., pp. 702-703.
United Nations, Proceedings. op. cit.. p. 60.
112Jacob and Atherton, op. cit., p. 460.
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Nevertheless, the formulation of a new agency by which 
| the developing nations can aid in the eradication, insofar 
| as it is possible, of economic vassalage and the placing 
of economic interdependence on a level of equality has 
been constructed —  even if the new nations' urge for 
formal equality has been subordinated' to the desire for 
; international aid. As Harlan Cleveland said to ECOSOC 
in the wake of UNCTAD:
It would be bad for ttie developing countries, and 
bad for international cooperation, if the peoples and 
parliaments of the developed nations came to believe 
that recommendations on trade and development matters 
bearing the U.N. trademark had been produced by an 
automatic majority of 75. It would be far better 
if people in both developed and developing countries 
came to believe that the U.N. stands for procedures 
that force both groups to study their common problems 
in depth and open their minds to the processes of 
mutual persuasion.113
Summary
The new nations directly or indirectly invoked the 
doctrine of equality of states as a rationale behind their 
efforts to affect changes in the structure of the United 
Nations. Because their representation had increased in 
the General Assembly, the new nations successfully cam­
paigned to increase the General Committee's membership 
on a wider and more equitable geographical basis. Using 
the same reasoning, the new nations, though conscious of 
the privileged position of the five permanent members
^ "’Gardner, on. cit., p. 704.
' of the Council prescribed by the Charter, played a dominant 
j role in the expansion of the non-permanent membership 
j of the Council from six to ten and in the distribution 
j of the increased membership on a more equitable scale.
The membership of the Social and Economic Council and its 
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations also accommo­
dated the new nations' demands for greater representation. 
ECOSOC's membership was increased from eighteen to twenty- 
seven and the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations' 
membership was increased from seven to thirteen.
Yet, the doctrine failed to achieve the results 
desired by the new nations in their efforts to reform the
i voting procedures in the financial agencies. Though 
opposed to the agencies’ systems of weighted voting, they 
tempered their opposition in order not to alienate their 
Western benefactors. This was most obvious in their 
attempts to establish SURFED. Their use of the doctrine 
again failed to fulfill their aspirations for a capital 
development fund which would have combined low interest 
rates with administrative deciaon-making governed by equal 
voting and simple majority. The Western nations refused 
to consent to their being placed in a minority position 
and be'cause of this opposition, the new nations compromised 
in order to remain as the recipients of Western aid. 
Appealing to the doctrine of state equality, the new 
nations were successful in the creation of UNCTAD. For 
the first time in history, an organization was dedicated
132
solely for the dual purpose of stimulating economic 
development among the developing nations and trade 
agreements designed to increase the developing nations' 
exports, export earnings, primary products and manufactur 
goods. Because of UNCTAD's need for financial support 
form the economically advanced nations of the world, 
however, the new nations' use of the doctrine for acquir­
ing an administrative structure governed by equal voting 
and simple majorities proved unsuccessful.
Discussion was concentrated on the above areas; 
however, this does not preclude the investigation of 
equally valid areas which can also indicate the influence 
of the new nations and their appeal to the doctrine of 
state equality. Such areas include the International 
Court of Justice, the International Law Commission, and 
the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee.
CHAPTER V
A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
OP THE NEW NATIONS AND THE DOCTRINE
The previous chapter indicated the results of the 
new nations application of the doctrine of equality of 
states as a rationale behind their efforts in the United 
Nations system to acquire greater equality with the West 
Yet, in order to evaluate effectively the contribution 
made by the new nations to the overall development of t'h 
doctrine, it is necessary to analyze their application 
of the doctrine in light of the three basic tenets of a 
sociological perspective of international law.
First, what relation exists, if any, between the 
new nations' application of the doctrine and their use 
of political reality?. The answer to this question is 
provided largely by the following two general trends of 
activity, both of which, this chapter contends, were 
evident in the new nations' involvement in the United 
Nations system and were the result of their careful 
appraisal of political and economic realities: (l) They 
invoked the doctrine as a means to support their demands 
for equality when avenues were onen for the realization 
of their demands, (2) They avoided pressing the doctrine 
as a rationale for their position to the point of alien­
ating vital support from other nations.
(
The first trend was most obvious in the new
nations1 efforts in the General Assembly and the Economic 
and Social Council. Since both U. N. organs were governed 
by the one nation-one vote system, the new nations knew 
that it v/as within reason to demand greater equality 
within the organ through increasing the membership of 
the Assembly's General Committee and ECOSOC's Committee 
on Non-Governmental Organizations. They were realistic 
enough to know that the Charter protected their demands 
and that they could utilize this protection to their own 
advantage. As Inis Claude said:
The vested interest of the small states in the 
egalitarian status quo is protected by two features 
of the amending process prescribed in Article 108 
°f the Charter. First, the requirement of unanimous 
ratification of amendments by the Big Five minimizes 
the likelihood of constitutional alteration, for the 
prospect of agreement among the great powers as to 
how differential voting weights should'be allocated 
is very small, even though they might agree in prin­
ciple on the need for institutionalizing inequality 
in the Assembly. Secondly, the provision that 
change can be accomplished only with the consent of 
two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, 
expressed ultimately in acts of ratification, puts 
the small states in a strong defensive position.
The rigidities of the established pattern are in 
their favor.
Yet, the new nations were far too realistic to 
believe that even the Assembly's voting system destroyed 
the distinction between great and small states. They 
acknowledged the fact that formal voting power was sig­
nificantly supplemented by informal capacity to affect
134-
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decisions." They also knew, however, that the Assembly, 
because of its basic universality of membership and its 
system of voting, provided an avenue for political man­
euvering between the two large blocs by which they could 
achieve a marginal and vicarious power that could supple­
ment their vote and thereby decrease their political 
inferiority. Benjamin Akzin said:
At times, thanks to the device of blocs, they 
obtained tactical advantages entirely out of pro­
portion with their general position in the scheme 
of things. The appearance of something resembling 
parliamentary groups has resulted in the attribution 
of a particular importance to the quantitative 
element in the make-up of international organizations
Political maneuvering was simply a pragmatic means 
to their objective, the enhancement of their political
the most part, acknowledged the institutionalization of 
the veto in the Security Council and the pervading
maneuvering was a realistic strategy of the new nations, 
it was, nevertheless, a position not without its dangers, 
for it:
creates in the international organization, in so 
far as secondary questions [important questions) are 
concerned, an apparent balance of forces, based on 
arithmetic, which bears very little resemblance to the 
actual forces in international life, thereby giving 
to international organization a somewhat unreal 
character. (Akzin, 0£. cit., p. 157.)
✓ ✓ h.
position vis-a-vis the large powers.
At the same time, however, the new nations, for
2
Claude, on. cit., p. 125.
5
^Akzin, oj2,. cit., p. 156.
4.
^It should be noted, however, that while political
influence on the Big Five. Yet, rather than concentrate 
solely on the abolition of an inequality which they recog- 
mized would be present as long as the large powers were 
present, they took whatever measures they could to dispel 
the gap between themselves and the great powers. One 
realistic plan which later proved successful was the 
expansion of the non-permanent membership of the Council.
The second trend was most obvious in the new 
nations’ efforts to create SUNFED and UNCTAD. In SUNFED, 
the new nations desired to achieve greater economic equal­
ity through low-interest loans. In UNCTAD, the new nation 
desired to achieve greater economic equality through trade 
agreements designed to increase their exports, export 
earnings, primary products, and manufactured goods. In 
both SUNPED and UNCTAD, however, the new nations desired 
governing boards where each member had only one vote and 
where decisions we® made by simple majority. Also, in 
each case, the new nations recognized that the best means 
available to them for the achievement of their objectives 
was not by an adamant demand for sovereign equality which 
could alienate their Western benefactors. John Hadwen 
and Johann Kaufmann noted that during the inumerable 
debates on the question of the U. N. establishing SUNPED:
The less developed countries always had a U. N. 
majority in favor of the immediate establishment of 
a large-scale capital developemtn fund. However, 
the majority was never used irresponsibly. No final 
(underlined in original text) action was taken 
which did not carry with it the countries from which
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the financial resources of any programme would have 
to come.5
Though again speaking of the new nations' fear of aliena­
ting financial support, yet going deeper into an analysis 
of the pragmatism exemplified by the new nations, Hadwen 
and Kaufmann said that the new nations hesitated in 
making a decision to establish SUNFED in the hope that 
funds would be made available because "if funds did not 
become available the idea of a large-scale U.N. capital 
aid fund would be dead once and for all. Delay from this
6
point of view at least avoided a final negative decision. :
Richard Gardner, referring to UNCTAD, noted that while the
new nations occasionally "passed resolutions over the
opposition of a minority of industrial countries on
matters affecting vital economic interests," they normally
accommodated the desires of the industrial nations with
the result that "in the closing days of UNCTAD there was
an encouraging disposition on all sides to reach a con-
7
sensus on some subjects."
Thus, realism prevailed over the assertion of 
equality and rather than demanding the establishment of 
SUNFED regardless of Western opposition, the new nations 
compromised and settled for the creation of the Special
^Hadwen and Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 108.
^Hadwen and Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 108.
'Gardner, ojo. cit., P* 702.
Fund and rather than demanding equal voting and simple 
majorities within the framework of UNCATD, the new nations 
j compromised and settled on creating a special committee 
designed "to establish a process of conciliation to take
O
place before voting."0
In short, t'he new nations enhanced their own position 
when possible by invoking the,doctrine and dropped the 
doctrine vrhen it interfered with vital economic support.
In both events, the doctrine was not confined to an appeal 
to unrealistic natural laws or to the will of the sover­
eign state. It was coupled with realism and, when exped­
ient, even subordinated to realism.
Second, what effects did the new nations and their 
application of the doctrine have on the evolution of 
international relations? Again the answer is provided 
I largely by two general trends of activity evident in 
the new nations' involvement in the United Nations system: 
(1) They invoked the doctrine as a rationale for their 
efforts in increasing the membership of the principle 
organs of the U.N., particularly the General Assembly, 
and in merging their superior numbers with the one nation- 
one vote system with the result that the rigid and even 
static bipolarity reflected in the Assembly began to 
accommodate the demands of this third force, (2) They 
invoked the doctrine as a means to support their demands
1.38
8
United Nations, Proceedings, o p . cit., p. 60.
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for economic equality with the results that the former 
colonialist powers began to grow sensitive to the economic 
development of the former dependencies.
The first trend was most evident in the General 
Assembly, although the loosening of rigid bipolarity was 
not confined solely to the Assembly. The Assembly simply
reflected to a large extent the changes occurring in the
o
overall picture of international relations.y Due to the 
preponderance of new nations in the General Assembly, the 
Assembly's method of voting, and the new nations' prag­
matic strategy of political maneuvering, the bipolariza­
tion of the large powers which demanded uncritical 
acceptance of the policy of either the Soviet Union or 
the United States began to change to a more pluralistic 
though complex structure. The tendency of both the 
Communist and the Western blocs to align other nations 
into one of the orbits of power failed when the new 
nations, denying the preachments that the world was locked
9
The reduction of bipolar rigidity as an evolution­
ary trend in the overall picture of international rela­
tions is beyond the scope of this chapter. For an analysis 
of this subject, however, see, for example: W. W. Kulski, 
International Politics in a Revolutionary A^e (New York:
J. B. Lippincott, 1964;, pp. 279-310; Gustavo Lagos, 
International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 
p. 113; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Amonf? Nations (3rd ed. 
rev.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 346-364; John 
G. Stoessinger,■ The Might of Nations (2nd ed. rev. ; New 
York: Random House, 1965), pp. 101-211.
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in an apocalyptic life-and-death struggle and acting 
only to preserve their own national interests, weighted 
the issues and cast their all-important vote, regardless 
of blocs, for programs which would, enhance their own 
status as equal partners in the family of nations. A 
vote for the United States did not necessarily mean a 
vote against the Soviet Union, but only a disagreement 
with the Soviet Union on a specific issue. This tendency 
was explained well by the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, 
Julius Nyerere, in a speech before the Tanganyikan 
National Assembly on June 1, 1961:
We give notice that no one will be able to count 
on an automatic vote from us simply because we are 
their friends. Nor should any country which feels 
. unfriendly toward us assume that we shall auto­
matically vote on the opposite side to it. We shall 
look at every issue in the light of whether we be­
lieve it supports the cause of freedom, of justice, 
and of peace in the world.10
The two major blocs realised that their voting 
power could increase only by identifying with the new 
nations. This desire for greater voting power and the 
attempts to equate their particular ideology with the 
aspirations of the "oppressed peoples of the world" 
resulted, according to Hans Morgenthau, in new tactical 
procedures. Traditionally, a large nations could bring
Hans Ko'hn, The Age of Nationalism (New York: 
Harper and Brot h e r s , 1962), pp. 146 and.153.
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its superior power to bear upon the weaker rations, 
thereby establishing dependencies and forming alliances, 
although alliances were fashioned primarily by selecting 
states in view of the power they could add. After the 
heavy influx of new nations into the U.N., however, a 
powerful nation which tried to elicit support for its 
policies through the General Assembly could not rely on 
its size and power alone since they availed it nothing 
if they were unable to attract the votes necessary for 
a two-t'hirds majority. Thus, the most powerful nation 
had to heed the desires of the smallest state which had 
equal voting strength and had to present the issues to be 
decided in terms that would appeal to the small states. 
While the linguistic transformation may have done nothing 
more than present ideological justifications and ration­
alizations of national policies, the constant use of a 
particular terminology may well have influenced subtly 
the substance of the transactions themselves to the 
extent that it could have resulted "in the blunting of 
the sharp edges of a national policy, its retreat from 
an advanced position, and its reformulation...in the 
light of the supranational principles embodied in the 
language of the resolution.
The second trend was most evident in the U.N. 
agencies established to aid the new nations in their
^ H a n s  J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (3rd 
ed. rev.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965)? PP» 495-494.
economic development. Though the new nations failed to 
change the weighted voting system of the financial agen­
cies, they were instrumental in creating the IDA which, 
contrary to the Bank's policy of "hard loans," charged 
no interest rates and uniformly granted a repayment period 
of fifty years. Although the new nations were unsuccessful 
in their attempts to establish SUNFED, they were success­
ful in applying enough pressure to the economically 
advanced countries that the larger nations finally con­
sented to a compromise which resulted in' the establish­
ment of the Special Fund. Although the new nations were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to guarantee for UNCTAD an 
administrative structure governed by a simple majority, 
they were successful in establishing UNCTAD "as an organ
of the General Assembly to be convened at intervals
IP
of not more than three years..." Thus, contrary to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the doctrine 
was invoked only by European colonial powers with little 
regard for their dependencies, the doctrine in the mid- 
twentieth century was used by the nev; nations to demand 
Western assistance in the construction of an indigenous 
economy.
■
The new nations even i^ere instrumental in giving 
| a dynamic connotation to economic terminology used both 
in SUNFED and UNCTAD. As Gunnas Myrdal said:
j 142
12Prebisch, 0£. cit., p. 49.
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The use of the concept "the underdeveloped countries" 
implies the value .judgment that it is an accepted gee. 1 
of public policy that the countries as designated, should 
experience economic development. It is with this impli­
cation that people in the poorer countries use the term 
and press its usage upon people in the richer countries. 
When they, in their turn, accept this term and suppress 
the old one, "the backward countries," they also accept 
the implication. The change from the static to the 
dynamic concept thus implies in the richer countries 
and, therefore, an acknowledgment - given naturally, 
only in a general and. therefore necessarily vague form - 
that those countries are right in demanding higher stand­
ards of income, a bigger share in the good things of life 
and greater equality of opportunity.
In short, the new nations used the doctrine to exert 
pressure on the status quo of international relations with
9
the result that there was a reduction of bipolar rigidity 
and the creation of a more sensitive attitude by the large 
powers to the economic development of the young states.
The doctrine when invoked by the new nations was no longer 
confined as it was by the naturalists and positivists, to 
European affairs.
Third, what effects did the new nations' application
of the doctrine have on the integration of political realism
1 /1
and the formulation of ethics? Contrary to the naturalist 
tendency of wrapping the doctrine in moral absolutes unre­
lated to political realities and the positivist tendency of 
separating the doctrine from ethics through its emphasis on 
posited legal authority emanating from the will of the state,
l7'
''Gustave Lagos, International Stratification and 
Underdeveloped Countries (Chanel "Hill; University of IW-hh 
Carolina Press, 1962), p. 113.
14
This chapter also uses the term "morla" as another 
expression for the term "ethical."
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the new nations coupled the doctrine with pragmatic means 
to obtain ethical objectives, considered earlier in the 
chapter though in different contexts. The db'hical objec­
tives were, first, the acquisition of a position in the 
U.S.. where they could participate in international decision­
making processes which formally were controlled primarily 
by the European nations and, more recently, by the bipolar
powers and, second, tlie modernization and economic advance-
15
ment of their countries. 'y It is ironic that the doctrine, 
developed largely in the West where the highly sophisticated 
institutions and systems of ethics based on human integrity 
were held in great esteem, was invoked by the new nations to 
support their objectives. While the great powers accommo­
dated the new nations largjely from a desire to use the new
nations' votes and support to increase their own position 
/ /
vis-a-vis their opposition, the new nations, on the other 
hand, capitalised on the new spirit of accommodation and
15
''It can be argued that the new nations' dual emphasis 
on one nation-one vote and majority rule is both unrealistic 
in the sense that "it does not reflect the greater portion 
of the world’s real power" and ethically questionable in that 
majority decisions, in particular, "cannot be identified as 
expressions of the dominant will of a genuine community." 
(Claude, ojd. cit., p. 119.) Rather than concentrate on this 
argument, this chapter intends only to draw a comparison 
between the naturalist and positivist positions and. the pos­
ition of the new nations. In relation to the argument, 
however, this chapter noted earlier in reference"to UNCTAD 
that the new nations were realistic enough not to push 
majority rule to the point of hindering their overall objec­
tive, economic assistance from the West. The new nations 
realized that decisions made by a simple majority would not 
reflect the attitudes of their Western berefactors and, there­
fore, they, along with the developed nations, created a 
special committee which would establish a "process of con­
ciliation to take place before voting..." (United Nations,
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directed it toward their own advancement. This large power 
accommodation, regardless of its derivatives, was a marked 
change of policy from colonilaist era. William L. Langer 
observed:
With reference to imperialism it is certainly true 
that there has been over the past century a marked al­
teration of mood, reflecting greater sensitivity to 
human suffering and a greater readiness to assume re­
sponsibility for the weak and helpless. In our day, 
anti-imperialism runs as strong in the West as did 
imperialism a couple of generations ago. Domination 
and exploitation of weaker peoples by the stronger, 
which seemed altogether natural in the past, is now 
felt to be incompatible with the principles of freedom, 
equality, and self-determination so generally accepted 
in modern societies.16
Perhaps the most important consideration is that the 
doctrine was invoked by the new nations to support their 
demands for equality when the demands w e® obtainable and 
was not pressed to the point of alienating vital support. 
The ethical objectives, supported by the doctrine, were 
placed in context with political realities with the result 
that the doctrine was subject neither to absolutism nor 
political naivete. The new nations verified Charles De 
Visscher's statement that "every renewed recognition of the 
foundations of power stimulates a renewal of values, every
1 n
return to the realities holds promise of effectiveness."
■
In short, the new nations, unlike the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century legal publicists, knew that their
Proceedings. o p . cit.. p. 60.)
^^Williams L. Langer, "Farewell to Empire," Foreign 
Affairs Vol. 41 (October, 1962), pp. 129-130.
17'Devisscher, o p .  cit., p. 365.
espousal of an ethic cased on equality of states was an 
unsupported ideal unless it included pragmatically derived 
means for its realization.
The contention ox this paper has been that by employ— 
ing the doctrine of the equality of states in such a way 
that it was oongruent with the basic tenets of a sociological 
perspective of international lav/, the new nations aided in 
the doctrine’s developemtn from myth to reality.. As fas as 
the future of the doctrine is concerned, it could be that 
the doctrine as applied by the new nations v/as only the 
antithesis of the doctrine as interpreted and applied by the 
naturalists and positivists. Using the pattern of the 
Hegalian dialectic, this paper suggests simply as a matter 
of speculation that the doctrine in both cases, the doctrine 
as applied by the publicists of the past centuries and the 
doctrine as applied by the new nations, is still rigid to a 
large extent because it is used by nation states as a just­
ification of their national sovereignty which tends to 
create smaller rather than larger political units. It is 
incongruent to the development of a universal supranational 
organization, fet, the new nations broke the status quo 
governed by the Western colonial powers and now that all 
nations, Western and non-Western, are participants in the 
overall development of international law, particularly 
through the U.N. and its related agencies, perhaps there 
will be more common agreement as was generally expressed at 
UNCTAD that the only means by which to construct a more
146
integrated world community is through conciliation, rather 
than a majority vote. Perhaps then, provided it reamins 
integrated with political realism, the doctrine will be 
given even greater universal overtones.
14?
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Appendix A (l)
(Source: United Nations, General Assembly, Considerations 
of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States: Proposal by 
Ghana, India, Mexico, and Yugoslavia (A/AC.119/L.28).
"The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States"
I. All States have the right to sovereign equality, which 
among others, includes the following elements:
A. That each State enjoys the rights inherent in full 
sovereignty.
B. That the personality of a state is inviolable as 
well as its territorial integrity and political 
independence.
C. The right to determine their political status, to 
choose their social, economic and cultural systems 
and pursue their development as they see fit and 
to conduct their internal and external policies 
without intervention by any other state; and
D. The right to the free disposal of their natural 
wealth and resources.
II. Correspondingly, every State has the duty to discharge 
faithfully its international obligations especially to 
live in peace with other States.
157
Appendix A (2)
(oourcet^United Nations, General Assembly, Consideration
.Principles of International Law Concerning "■rieridw—
Relations and Co-operation Among; States: Proposal by 
Czechoslovakia CA/AC.iiy/U6, November 16, 1964).)
"The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States"
1. States are sovereign and as such are equal among them­
selves, as subjects of international law they have 
equal rights and duties, and reasons of a political 
social, economic, geographic or other nature cannot * 
restrict the capacity oi a State to act or assume 
obligations as an equal member of the international 
community.
2. Each State shall respect the supreme authority of each 
other State over the territory, including territorial 
waters and air space of the latter State, and shall
also respect its independence in international relations.
3. Each State shall have the right to take part in the 
solution of international questions affecting its 
legitimate interests, including the right to' join 
international organizations and to become party to 
multilateral treaties dealing with or governing 
matters involving such interests.
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Appendix A (3)
(Source: United Nations, General Assembly, Consideration 
of Principles of International Lav; Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States (A/5746. Novembev 
16, 1964).) ' ' ...
"Decision of the Special Committee on the Recommendations 
of the Drafting Committee"
On the recommendation of the Drafting Committee, the 
Special Committee at its 39th meeting, adopted unanimously 
the following text:
Points of consensus
1. All States enjoy sovereign equality. As subjects of
international law, they have equal rights and duties.
2. In particular, sovereign equality includes the
following elements:
a. States are juridically equal.
b. Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full 
sovereignty.
c. Each State has the duty to respect the personality 
of other States.
d. The territorial integrity and political independence 
of the State are inviolable.
e. Each State has the rights freely to choose and 
develop its political, social, economic and 
cultural system.
f. Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good 
faith with its international obligations, and to 
live in peace with other States.
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Appendix B 
Newly Independent Nations
192? 19^6 1962
Nepal Morocco Algeria
Sudan Burundi
194? Tunisia Jamaica
Lebanon Rwanda
1944
19?7 Trinidad & Toba:
Ghana Uganda
Iceland Western Samoa
Syria 1958
1946
Guinea
United Arab Republic Kenya
Jordan Malaysia
Philippines I960 ^Zanzibar
1947
Cameroon
Central African Republic 1964
India Chad Malawi
Pakistan Congo (Brazzaville) Malta
Yemen Congo (Leopoldville) *Tanzania
Cyprus Zambia
1948 Dahomey
Burma Sab on 196^
Ceylon Ivory Coast Maldive Islands
Israel Malagasy Republic Singapore
Korea Mali The Gambia
1949
Mauritania
Niger 1966
Cambodia Nigeria Barbados
Indonesia Senegal Basutoland
Laos Somali Republic Botswana
Vietnam Togo Swaziland
1951
Libya
Upper Volta 
1961
Kuwait
Sierra Leone 
^Tanganyika
*Tanzania was formed by the merger of Tanganyika and 
Zambia in April, 1964.
Source: William V. O'Brien (ed.), The New Nations in Inter­
national Lav; and Diplomacy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965). For nations independent since 1966, see: United 
Nations, Delegations to the United Nations, Twenty-first 
Session (ST/3G/SSR.B/17), (New York, 1966).
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